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JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN

AND WILLIAM J. STUNTZ

HABEAS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The past few years have seen a series of Supreme Court decisions
dramatically altering the law of federal habeas corpus.' Some of
these decisions have significantly restricted access to habeas; others
have declined to impose similar restrictions. No obvious pattern
appears. The Court is fractured, and no one seems able to predict
what will happen next.
Our purpose in writing this article is not to analyze or attack
particular habeas decisions. 2 Rather, our goal is to suggest that the
current state of confusion over habeas law involves more than the
problem of how to decide particular cases or resolve particular
issues. We believe that the present confusion exists primarily because the Court, along with most commentators, is not even thinking about habeas in the proper way. Both habeas law and habeas
literature have failed to internalize the fact that habeas is a part of
Joseph L. Hoffmann is Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana
University at Bloomington. William J. Stuntz is Professor of Law and E. James Kelly, Jr.,
Research Professor, University of Virginia.
AUTHORS' NoTE: The authors wish to thank Barry Friedman, John Jeffries, Nancy King,
Peter Low, and George Rutherglen for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989); Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302 (1989); Butler v McKellar,
494 US 407 (1990); Stringer v Black, 112 S Ct 1130 (1992); Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S Ct

1715 (1992); Wrrgbt v West, 112 S Ct 2482 (1992); Herrerav Collins, 113 S Ct 853 (1993);
Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S Ct 1710 (1993); Withrow v Williams, 113 S Ct 1745 (1993).
2 Others have already done so. See, for example, Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45

Vand L Rev 797 (1992) (analyzing and attacking Teague v Lane); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse
Next Time?: The AnachronisticAttack on Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity, 92 Colum L Rev

1997 (1992) (analyzing opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas, and attacking
position taken by Justice Thomas, in Wight v West); Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While
It Lasted, 81 J Crim L & Criminol 9 (1990) (analyzing and attacking Teague v Lane).
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the criminal justice system. This inattention to habeas's substantive
legal context has prevented the development of a coherent intellectual framework for modern habeas law.
To put it differently, we think the current habeas confusion
stems from a miscategorization. Habeas has long been viewed as a
particular species of the genus of federal court remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights. Habeas issues have thus been
seen as "of a kind" with issues that arise in Section 1983 litigation,
the immunity of state governments and officials, Younger v Harris
abstention, and the Eleventh Amendment. Specifically, the prevailing approach to habeas has focused the Court's attention on
two competing ideologies that Professor Richard Fallon has aptly
labeled "Federalism" and "Nationalism." 3 Federalists argue for
greater state autonomy and less federal intervention; the Framing
of the Constitution provides the historical anchor for this ideology.
Nationalists, on the other hand, claim that federal interests require
federal enforcement and that state courts cannot be fully relied
upon to protect federal rights; the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War is the historical impetus behind the Nationalist
view. Much of the law of federal courts today-whether in habeas,
Section 1983, immunity doctrine, or the Eleventh Amendmentis the product of the struggle between these competing ideo4
logies.
That struggle, we believe, no longer provides a satisfactory
framework for the habeas debate. A third historical event is more
important to defining the proper scope of modern habeas law than
either the Framing or Reconstruction: the Criminal Procedure Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.
As far as the law of criminal procedure is concerned, the Revolution changed everything. Before the Revolution, the federal constitutional law that was relevant to state criminal cases (based primarily, though not exclusively, on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment) operated as a background limitation on
the power of the states. Although it was federal law, and thus
"supreme," the Due Process Clause left substantial room for the
development and day-to-day operation of state criminal procedure
3Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va L Rev 1141 (1988).
4Id at 1164-1224 (detailing influence of Federalist and Nationalist ideologies on development of several doctrinal areas within the law of federal courts).
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doctrine. In other words, before the Revolution, federal constitutional law affected the handling of state criminal cases in much the
same way that it affected other common kinds of state action, such
as the regulation of property rights or the administration of public
schools and universities.
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the role of federal constitutional law in state criminal cases was completely transformed.
Through incorporation of most of the specific criminal procedure
guarantees contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
the Court rendered state criminal procedure doctrine in such areas
as search and seizure, interrogation, the right to counsel, jury selection, and double jeopardy essentially meaningless. Since the Revolution, the only criminal procedure law that matters on most issues-from the point of view of both state and federal courts-is
federal criminal procedure law. Federal criminal procedure law has
become in effect a detailed, national Code of Criminal Procedure
that almost totally supersedes state law.
This transformation has not gone unnoticed by habeas courts
and the academics who study them. But its implications have not
been fully recognized. When criminal procedure issues appear in
habeas cases and commentaries, they usually appear as an afterthought-as though all constitutional rights, and all constitutional
litigation, are the same. But the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants differ from other federal rights, both in their relationship to state law and in the ways they are enforced. And criminal
litigation is not like other forms of constitutional litigation. These
differences ought to matter to any sensible vision of habeas

corpus.

5

After the Revolution, it no longer makes sense to think about
habeas primarily in terms of the ideological struggle between Federalism and Nationalism. The historical tension between state and
5 Throughout this article, we discuss federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions. There is a parallel system of federal collateral review for federal criminal cases. That
system, based for the most part on 28 USC § 2255, differs in some important ways from
the law governing federal habeas for state prisoners. Perhaps the most important difference
is in the treatment of claims previously adjudicated on direct appeal; unlike habeas courts
reviewing state convictions, federal courts operating under Section 2255 generally may not
reexamine previously litigated and rejected claims. See Davis v United States, 417 US 333,
342 (1974); James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 36.7(e), at
569-70 (Michie Co 1988). We do not discuss this parallel system of federal collateral review
for federal criminal cases, mainly because courts and commentators have focused much
more heavily on federal habeas for state prisoners.
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federal law, which still exists in most areas of federal constitutional
law today, has been almost completely eliminated in the criminal
procedure context. Because there is no longer a significant body of
state criminal procedure law to conflict with the federal criminal
procedure rights that are enforced through habeas, modern habeas
issues should be resolved in light of the values and concerns that
are relevant to criminal procedure, not those of federal courts law.
We therefore propose a change in the terms of the habeas debate-a
change that refocuses attention and energy on the task of identifying the most effective role for habeas to play within the criminal
6
justice system.
Our approach is fairly simple. We believe that habeas law should
serve the basic goals of the criminal justice system: ensuring just
outcomes for defendants, deterring unconstitutional behavior by
government actors, and preserving needed opportunities for federal
lawmaking. Yet these goals need not be addressed by a set of uni6 On August 6, 1993, Joseph Biden introduced S. 1441, the Habeas Corpus Reform Act
of 1993, in the U.S. Senate. Similar habeas reform legislation was also introduced in the
U.S. House of Representatives. These reform initiatives would have made several important
changes in the statute governing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, 28 USC §§ 2241
et seq. Included among these changes would have been (1) the institution of a filing deadline
for habeas petitions; (2) the codification of a general rule of non-retroactive application of
new rules to habeas cases, along the lines of the Court's decision in Teague v Lane, 489 US
288 (1989); (3) a provision mandating de novo review on all matters of established federal
law, including the application of law to facts, by habeas courts; (4) limitations on successive
habeas petitions; (5) recognition of a right to habeas relief, even on a successive habeas
petition, if a capital defendant could present sufficient new evidence of innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty; and (6) various provisions mandating the appointment of certifiedly qualified counsel to represent capital defendants during all state court proceedings and
on certiorari to the Court.
In late 1993, these proposed habeas reforms were dropped from the packages of federal
crime legislation that eventually passed the House and Senate, respectively, and were sent
to a conference committee. As this article went to press, therefore, no habeas reform legislation seemed likely to emerge from Congress during 1994.
Although this article discusses primarily the Supreme Court's current view of the proper
role of habeas, and explains why we think that view should change to reflect the dramatic
impact of the Criminal Procedure Revolution, the article could just as easily be aimed at
Congress in its consideration of the most appropriate role for habeas in the future. Whoever
is making the relevant decisions about the nature and scope of habeas, we believe, should
take into account the uniquely dominant role of federal criminal procedure law in the
modern handling of state criminal cases. We think that Congress, like the Court, should
try to identify and implement the most appropriate role for habeas within the criminal
justice system, rather than engage in an outmoded debate about federalism, comity, the
right to a federal forum, and the parity of state and federal courts. And it seems obvious
to us that the proposed legislation, especially in its adoption of a de novo habeas standard
of review, would represent a continuation of the same misguided approach to habeas that
we criticize in the article.
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tary, "one size fits all" habeas rules. We propose two "tracks" of
habeas relief-one focused on the protection of innocents, the other
focused on deterrence. On the first track, petitioners who can demonstrate a reasonable probability of innocence would receive de
novo review of their federal claims, free of the restrictions currently
imposed by the habeas doctrines of procedural default and retroactivity. On the second track, petitioners who cannot make a sufficient showing of innocence would have their federal claims
(whether legal, factual, or mixed, and including those Fourth
Amendment claims now barred in habeas under Stone v Powell)
reviewed solely to determine if the state court acted reasonably in
denying them; such deferential review is all that is needed for
habeas to fulfill its deterrence role. By providing two separate roads
to habeas relief, we can dispense with much of the complexity
surrounding such doctrines as procedural default, the rule of
Stone v Powell, and retroactivity. And this can be done without
eliminating the ability of federal courts to make federal law where
needed.
In Part I, we discuss the prevailing federal courts approach to
habeas and explain why we believe that approach to be obsolete.
In Part II, we develop the structure, and identify the basic values
and concerns, of a habeas jurisprudence grounded in the criminal
justice system. In Part III, we sketch some of the likely doctrinal
implications of our proposed approach. Finally, in Part IV, we
address the special context of death penalty cases, and suggest how
our approach to habeas might produce a completely separate set of
habeas doctrines applicable solely to capital cases.
I.

HABEAS AND THE IDEOLOGIES OF FEDERAL COURTS LAW

The statutory writ of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners can be categorized as one example of the general class of federal
court remedies that have been created~or recognized for the purpose
of redressing violations of federal constitutional rights. This traditional classification of habeas has shaped the views of generations
of lawyers, judges, and academics. For instance, although today a
few criminal procedure casebooks include a smattering of habeas
cases, for more than fifty years (dating back to well before Hart
and Wechsler) habeas has appeared in law school curricula in fed-
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eral courts courses, if it has appeared at all. 7 The traditional mind
set has thus tended to see habeas issues as similar to other federal
courts issues such as the scope of Section 1983, the availability of
injunctions against state judicial proceedings, and the meaning of
the Eleventh Amendment.8
The categorization of habeas as a member of the class of federal
remedies for constitutional violations by state and local officials is
not wrong; on the contrary, it is both correct and important. But it
is also misleading, for habeas is part of another system as well-the
criminal justice system. And the criminal justice system is quite
different, substantively and procedurally, from the other settings
in which federal constitutional law is enforced against state and
local actors.

A. HABEAS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS DEBATE

The federal courts approach to habeas, like the federal courts
approach to other federal remedies, has emerged from the tension
between Federalism and Nationalism. Federalists tend to think of
the Constitution as a document that preserves the balance between
federal and state authority by carefully limiting federal power. In
the judicial arena, Federalists view state and federal courts as
equally competent and equally dedicated to the enforcement of
federal rights-in other words, they believe in the "parity" of state
and federal courts. For these reasons, when federal and state juris-

7 For representative treatments of habeas in pre-Hart and Wechsler casebooks, see Felix
Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz, Casesand OtherAuthoritieson FederalJurisdictionand Procedure
476-95 (1931); Charles T. McCormick and James H. Chadbourn, Cases and Materials on
Federal Courts 395-413 (1946) (McCormick and Chadbourn, "Federal Courts"). Treatises of
the same period show habeas firmly located in the federal courts domain. See Armistead M.
Dobie, Handbook of FederalJurisdictionand Procedure293-322 (1928). The Hart and Wechsler
casebook, the first edition of which was published in 1953, expanded the coverage of habeas
issues, see Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1232-1312 (1953), but it did not relocate habeas in the law school curriculum.
8 The point is seen most clearly in older Federal Courts books, which did not have a
separate unit on habeas corpus, but included the subject in a unit covering a variety of
federalism issues. For example, McCormick and Chadbourn placed habeas in a unit titled
"Conflicts between State and National Judicial Systems"; the unit also covered sovereign
immunity, injunctions of state court proceedings, injunctions of state taxes, and the use of
three-judge panels for constitutional challenges to state legislation. McCormick and Chadbourn, Federal Courts, at 298-413 (cited in note 7).

HABEAS CORPUS

71

to favor comity and deference to
diction overlaps, Federalists tend
9
decisions made by state courts.
Nationalism stresses national supremacy, federal interests, and
federal enforcement of federal constitutional rights, at the expense
of state sovereignty. Nationalists tend to think of the Constitution
as a document built around the Fourteenth Amendment-as a
charter that, first and foremost, protects individual rights against
state infringement. And they believe only federal court enforcement of those rights can provide the necessary protection. From a
Nationalist point of view, the federal courts are more trustworthy
adjudicators of claims involving possible violations of federal rights;
even the lower federal courts are generally superior to state courts
in their ability to ensure the supremacy of federal constitutional
law. For these reasons, Nationalists emphasize the importance of
federal judicial review of federal constitutional claims, and discount
0
the values of comity and deference to state court decisions.'
Of course, few cases have been decided solely on the basis of
one or the other of these ideologies, and few judges consistently
adopt either polar position. Rather, as Professor Fallon suggests,
Federalism and Nationalism tend to serve either as rhetorical structures or as ideal models of the way the world should work. " Nevertheless, these two ideologies have done much to shape the law of
federal courts. Disputed issues in a wide variety of areas have been
analyzed and debated in terms of the values and considerations
that are central to Federalism and Nationalism: comity, state sovereignty, the importance of federal enforcement of federal rights, and
the relative competence and dedication of state and federal courts
in enforcing those federal rights.
The pattern holds true for habeas doctrine as for other areas of
federal courts law. In Coleman v Thompson, a recent Court decision
about the scope of procedural default doctrine in habeas cases,
Justice O'Connor began her majority opinion as follows:
This is a case about federalism. It concerns the respect that
federal courts owe the States and the States' procedural rules

9 Fallon, 74 Va L Rev at 1151-57 (cited in note 3).
10 Id at 1158-64.
11Id at 1145-50.
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when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas
corpus. 12

The opinion predictably proceeded to defer to the relevant state
court decision dismissing the defendant's state habeas appeal.13 Justice Blackmun's dissent in Coleman responded in kind:
The majority proceeds as if the sovereign interests of the States
and the Federal Government were co-equal. Ours, however, is
a federal republic, conceived on the principle of a supreme
federal power ....The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by the citizens of the several States expanded federal
powers even further, with a corresponding diminution of state

sovereignty .... 14
Justice Blackmun went on to argue that federal courts must serve
"as guardians of the people's federal rights,"'" and so concluded
that the dismissal of the defendant's state court appeal should not
preclude federal court review of the merits of the defendant's federal claims. 16
Coleman is a prime example of a common phenomenon. For the
past four decades, Court opinions in habeas cases have resembled
a tug-of-war between Nationalism and Federalism. In the 1950s

12Coleman v Thompson, 111 S Ct 2546, 2552 (1991).

13Id at 2561-66. In Coleman, there were two potential obstacles to this deference: the
state court order dismissing Coleman's state habeas appeal had not specified the grounds
for the dismissal, and Coleman's lawyer in state habeas proceedings had incompetently failed
to file his appeal on time. Most of Justice O'Connor's opinion was devoted to establishing
that the dismissal was apparently based on an adequate and independent state ground (the
petitioner had filed his appeal one day late), and that the state court did not need so to
specify in order for the default to "count" in federal habeas proceedings. Id at 2553-61.
With respect to the attorney incompetence issue, Justice O'Connor fairly quickly concluded
that absent a right to any counsel on state habeas-earlier decisions made clear there is no
such right-there can be no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.
Id at 2566-68.
Throughout her analysis for the Court on both issues, Justice O'Connor treated habeas
review of state criminal cases as something akin to a diplomatic faux pas: an affront to
another sovereign, of the sort that ought to be avoided unless absolutely necessary.
14Id at 2570 (Blackmun dissenting).
Is Id, quoting Mitcbum v Foster, 407 US 225, 242 (1972).
16That is, Justice Blackmun concluded that absent a plain statement to the contrary, the
Court should assume that the state court order rested on federal law, and hence lacked any
adequate and independent state ground. Id at 2571-76. And he further argued that ineffective assistance of counsel should constitute "cause" for a procedural default even if the
default occurred in state habeas proceedings. Id at 2576-78.
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and 1960s, in cases like Brown v Allen 17 and Fay v Noia, 18 Nationalism prevailed; more recently, as in Coleman, the Federalists have
won most of the battles. 19 But the relevant values-federalism,
comity, the importance of enforcing federal rights in federal courts,
and the relative dedication and competence of federal and state
courts-have remained unchanged.
Scholars have responded accordingly. The late Paul Bator's famous article, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal Habeas Corpusfor
State Prisoners,2 ° virtually defined the Federalist approach to habeas,
emphasizing deference to state courts and the equal ability of state
and federal judges to apply federal law. Well-known articles by
Burt Neuborne2 1 and Gary Peller2 2 responded from a Nationalist
orientation: Neuborne's article took issue with the assumption of
parity among state and federal judges, while Peller emphasized
habeas's place in the Nationalist tradition dating back to Reconstruction. More recently, as the Court's habeas decisions have become more Federalist, academics have tended to move in the opposite direction, as evidenced by the largely Nationalist writings of
23 Barry Friedman,24 James Liebman,25 and Ann
Larry Yackle,26
Woolhandler.
Some habeas commentary has not fit this pattern. Judge
'" 344 US 443 (1953). Brown held that any federal constitutional claim could entitle a
habeas petitioner to relief, notwithstanding that the constitutional claim was decided adversely to the petitioner by a state court that had jurisdiction over the case. The practical
effect of Brown was to open up habeas to all possible constitutional claims, not merely those
that might cast some shadow on the state court's jurisdiction.
18372 US 391 (1963). Fay held that procedurally defaulted claims could be raised on

federal habeas as long as the default was not "deliberate" (which, in the nature of things,
it rarely is).
'" For the leading examples, see Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976); Wainwright v Sykes,
433 US 72 (1977); Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989); Brecbt v Abrabamson, 113 S Ct 1710
(1993).
20 76 Harv L Rev 441 (1963).
21 Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105 (1977).
2' Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 579
(1982).
23 Larry W. Yackle, ExplainingHabeas Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991 (1985).

24Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn L Rev 247 (1988); Friedman, 45 Vand
L Rev 797 (cited in note 2).
75James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Supreme Court'sRout of HabeasCorpus
Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 537 (1990-91); Liebman, 92
Colum L Rev 1997 (cited in note 2).
26 Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 Stan L Rev 575 (1993).
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Friendly's article Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal
2 7 focused on the
Judgments
relationship of habeas to the guiltinnocence determination. And many of Justice Harlan's opinions
in habeas cases exhibited a special concern with how habeas could
serve to deter misinterpretations of federal law by state courts.2 8
These two jurists, along with some others, sought to analyze habeas as a part of criminal procedure. But their approach has been
the exception. Most habeas opinions and articles have remained
anchored in the Federalism-Nationalism debate.
Two particular types of habeas argument that have become increasingly popular in recent years are really disguised versions of
that debate. The first is the argument from Congressional intent.
Because federal habeas for state prisoners is based on a federal
statute, this argument goes, the crucial question in deciding a disputed habeas issue ought to be: What does Congress think about
the issue? Or, at least, what did Congress think when it last
amended the statute in relevant ways?
Arguments from Congressional intent, however, face an enormous obstacle: the habeas statute simply does not speak to any of
the key issues in habeas law. The statute does not define habeas's
substantive scope, 29 nor does it dictate a particular rule of procedural default, harmless error, or retroactivity.30 Consistent with
2738 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970).
25 See Desist v United States, 394 US 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan dissenting); Mackey v United
States, 401 US 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan dissenting and concurring in the judgment).
In Desist, Justice Harlan expressed the view that habeas serves both to protect innocent
defendants and to deter state courts from violating federal constitutional standards. 394 US
at 262-63. But after a majority of the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule applied in habeas cases, Harlan concluded that the protection of innocence must no
longer be a principal purpose of habeas. Thus, in Mackey, Harlan wrote that the "primary
justification" of habeas is to provide an incentive for state courts to "toe the constitutional
mark." 401 US at 687.
29 The statute provides that habeas courts "shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States." 28 USC § 2254(a). This language suggests not that all federal claims
must be considered, but that no non-federal claims may be considered. In addition, the
statute directs habeas courts to decide petitions "as law and justice require." 28 USC § 2243.
The combination of these provisions seems to leave substantive scope wholly undefined.
" Thus, the Court has dramatically changed its positions with respect to both procedural
default and habeas retroactivity, even in the absence of major changes in the statutory
language. Compare Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963) (no procedural default bar to habeas
relief absent "deliberate bypass"), with Wainwrigbt v Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977) (procedural
default bar to habeas relief unless petitioner can show "cause" and "prejudice"); compare
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the statute, the habeas remedy could be-and has been-broad
and fundamental, narrow and unimportant, or somewhere in between. Nor is there much evidence of what the 1867 Congress, or
any of the Congresses that have amended the statute, thought about
such issues. The ironic result is that arguments from Congressional
intent almost invariably rest not on statutory language or legislative
history, but on the parsing of Supreme Court opinions that supposedly formed the relevant backdrop to Congressional action. 3 And
the Court opinions themselves focus heavily on (surprise!) comity,
federalism, the importance of a federal forum for federal rights,
and the relative trustworthiness of state courts-in other words,
the standard litany of Federalist and Nationalist concerns.
The second argument, a cousin of the first, is the appeal to
habeas history. This argument assumes that Congressional intent
is unknowable; it looks instead to the broad traditions of habeas
law since 1867. The hope is that, by examining habeas history,
one can identify a consistent ideological perspective, at least with
respect to a particular habeas issue, that can be attributed to Congress, the Court, or both. This ideological perspective can then,
in turn, be used to decide the disputed case. The opinions ofJustice
Thomas and Justice O'Connor in Wright v West 2 are typical: Justice
Thomas argued that the broad sweep of habeas history revealed a
general Federalist pattern of deference to state court adjudications
Solem v Stumes, 465 US 638 (1984) (retroactive application of new rules to habeas petitions
determined by balancing test of Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965)), with Teague v Lane,
489 US 288 (1989) (new rules generally not retroactively applicable to habeas petitions).
The Court has acknowledged its own "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier
views of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action
has remained unchanged." Sykes, 433 US at 81.
31See, for example, Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S Ct 1715, 1721, 1725-27 (1992) (O'Connor dissenting) ('IThe fact that Section 2254(d)(3) uses language identical to the language
we used in Townsend [v Sain, 372 US 293 (1963),] strongly suggests that Congress presumed
the continued existence of Townsend"); Wainwrigbt v Sykes, 433 US 72, 99, 106 n 7 (1977)
(Brennan dissenting) ("Congress' grant of post-trial access to the federal courts was reconfirmed by its modification of 28 USC Section 2254 following our decisions in Fay [v Noia,
372 US 391 (1963),] and Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293 (1963)"); Liebman, 92 Colum L Rev
at 2087-88 (cited in note 2) (concluding, based on analysis of both majority and dissenting
Court opinions, that Congress's 1966 amendment to habeas statute "did not quite codify
prior law" but instead "responded directly" to Sanders v United States, 373 US 1 (1963), and
Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293 (1963), and thereby "restored prior law against some of the
controversial changes the Court made").
3 112 S Ct 2482, 2484 (Thomas's plurality opinion); id at 2493 (O'Connor concurring in
the judgment).
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that had never been squarely rejected by the Court;33 while Justice
O'Connor argued that habeas history, at least with respect to applications of federal law to the facts of particular state criminal cases,
showed a strong Nationalist preference. 34
Habeas history arguments face a fundamental problem, too: they
omit a key part of the history. For most of the habeas history to
which Justices Thomas and O'Connor referred in Wright v West,
federal criminal procedure doctrine was almost nonexistent.Y
Whether habeas review was "broad" or "restrictive" made very
little practical difference, because there were so few colorable
grounds for constitutional claims. Indeed, as a general matter, it
can fairly be said that habeas's most persistent tradition has been
its near-irrelevance-a tradition that was overturned (and dramatically so) only during the past thirty years. In light of this crucial
difference between pre- and post-1960s federal criminal procedure,
it seems pointless to try to draw elaborate lessons about the proper
resolution of modern habeas disputes from forty- and seventy-yearold habeas cases (as the opinions in Wright v West purported to do 36 ).
" Id at 2486-91 (Thomas's plurality opinion).
14 Id at 2493-97 (O'Connor concurring in the judgment).
An unusually long and comprehensive example of this kind of argument appears in a
recent article by Professor James Liebman attacking the apparent suggestion by Justice
Thomas in Wnigbt v West that a "reasonableness" standard of review might properly apply
to mixed issues of law and fact on habeas. See Liebman, 92 Colum L Rev at 2041-94 (cited
in note 2) (contending that, ever since 1867, habeas has been consistently defined as a virtual
mirror image of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction-and that a "reasonableness"
habeas standard of review for mixed issues would be inconsistent with the direct-appeal
analogy).
11This is at least true of the portion of criminal procedure law that applied to the states.
For example, the Supreme Court's first involuntary confession case is in 1936, Brown v
Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936), and for the succeeding thirty years confessions law consisted
of little more than an admonition to police not to be too brutal or offensive. So too, the
Court applied search-and-seizure restrictions to the states only in 1949, Wolfv Colorado, 338
US 25 (1949), and for the following twelve years those restrictions consisted solely of the
"shock the conscience" test. See Rochin v California, 342 US 165 (1952) (holding that pumping
defendant's stomach to obtain evidence violated due process); Irvine v California, 347 US
128 (1954) (holding that repeated illegal entries into the defendant's home did not). There
was no constitutional right to counsel until the 1930s, and even then it was designed to be
exceptional. Compare Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932) (counsel required in capital cases)
with Betts v Brady, 316 US 455 (1942) (for non-capital cases, counsel required only given
some showing of special need). Plus, prior to the 1960s (and in some instances later), there
were essentially no constitutional rules applicable to jury selection, discovery, selfincrimination (apart from police questioning), double jeopardy and mistrials, ineffective
assistance, or burdens of persuasion.
36 See 112 S Ct at 2487-88 (Thomas's plurality opinion), discussing Brown v Allen, 344
US 443 (1953); id at 2494 (O'Connor concurring in the judgment), discussing Moore v
Dempsey, 261 US 86 (1923), and Frankv Mangum, 237 US 309 (1915).
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Upon closer examination, the arguments from Congressional intent and from habeas history both serve merely to translate the
claim, "This is what I believe about federalism, comity, federal
enforcement of federal rights, and parity," into either, "This is
what Congress believes about federalism, comity, federal enforcement of federal rights, and parity," or, "This is what we've all
believed for a long time about federalism, comity, federal enforcement of federal rights, and parity." The difficulty with such arguments is that they are not based on the proper set of values. Federalism and Nationalism simply do not provide a satisfactory
framework for the modern habeas debate.
B. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION AND THE DISPLACEMENT
OF STATE LAW

To see why Federalism and Nationalism should no longer frame
the habeas debate, one must think about how dramatically criminal
procedure has changed over the past thirty years. Before the 1960s,
the states were relatively free to go about their business, making
and applying state criminal procedure law (or simply acting according to the discretionary judgments and practices of state or
local officials), so long as they did not run afoul of the broad limitations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In this way,
federal constitutional law operated in state criminal cases much as
it does today in most other areas: it provided a vaguely defined
"floor" of constitutional protection below which the states could
not fall, but otherwise was not a significant presence in the day-today work of state officials and state judges.
When the Court incorporated most of the specific criminal procedure guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, thus making
those guarantees applicable to the states, it radically transformed
37
the role of federal constitutional law in state criminal cases.
Through such landmark decisions as Mapp v Ohio38 (extending the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states), Gideon v
Wainwrightl9 (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's right to coun11The Court also, during the same period, expanded the range of rules based directly on
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
J 367 US 643 (1961).
9 372 US 335 (1963).
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sel), Malloy v Hogan' (incorporating the Fifth Amendment's selfincrimination privilege), and Miranda v Arizona4 1 (requiring the
states to give warnings, based on the Fifth Amendment, before
interrogating suspects in custody), the Court converted federal
criminal procedure law from a rarely invoked "background" limit
on the states into a detailed set of rules that defined, on a day-to-day
basis, the scope of state powers to investigate and prosecute crimes.
It is hard to overstate the effect of these cases. Thirty-five years
ago, a police officer who wanted to search the glove compartment
of a suspect's car for evidence would have looked primarily to
state law for any regulation of his conduct, as would a state judge
reviewing that conduct to determine the admissibility of the evidence; federal law was (for the most part) a concern only for a few
extremely intrusive kinds of searches. 42 Today, by contrast, both
the officer and the state judge would look to federal law, which
provides a detailed set of rules governing the incidence and scope
of car searches. 4 3 Similar examples can be found everywhere in
the law of criminal procedure. Interrogation of suspects, 44 use of
peremptory challenges, 4S rules governing mistrials, 46 potential conflicts of interest by defense counsel,47 prosecutorial disclosure of

'o 378 US 1 (1964).
4 384 US 436 (1966).
42 Prior to 1961, only state searches and seizures that shocked the judicial conscience led
to any federal sanction. Rochin v California,342 US 165 (1952). Rocbin itself was an extreme
case-the government had ordered the defendant's stomach pumped in order to retrieve a
pair of capsules containing morphine-and the Court made it clear that only extreme cases
would be sufficiently "shocking." See Irvine v California,347 US 128 (1954) (repeated illegal
entries into defendant's home combined with eavesdropping of private conversations did
not violate the Rochin standard).
41See, for example, California v Acevedo, 11l S Ct 1982 (1991) (car searches based on
probable cause); New York v Belton, 453 US 454 (1981) (car searches incident to arrest of
occupant); Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367 (1987) (inventory searches of cars); Michigan v
Long, 463 US 1032 (1983) (car "frisks" for weapons).
I See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966); Massiab v UnitedStates, 377 US 201 (1964).
Both of these major interrogation cases have spawned many additional Court rulings. See,
for example, Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981) (invocation of Miranda "right to counsel"
precludes further interrogation); Maine v Moulton, 474 US 159 (1985) (Massiab prohibits useof statements made by defendant charged with one crime to undercover police agents conducting investigation of other crimes).
15See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), and its progeny.
46 See Illinois v Somerville, 410 US 458 (1973); United States vJorn, 400 US 470 (1971);
Downum v United States, 372 US 734 (1963).
17See Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335 (1980); Burger v Kemp, 483 US 776 (1987).
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exculpatory evidence 48-all these matters, and many more, were
once governed entirely (or almost entirely) by state and local law;
all now are governed, with rare exceptions, entirely by federal law.
In short, wherever federal criminal procedure law exists today,
that law dominates the landscape. Federal constitutional criminal
procedure law no longer serves as a vaguely defined "floor," above
which the states are free to develop and administer their criminal
justice systems with relative independence. Rather, federal law
today serves as a floor and a ceiling and everything in between:
federal law dictates, often in minute detail, the course of state
criminal proceedings.
One might say that, in the criminal procedure context, the Nationalist view of federal-state relations triumphed, and the Federalists were routed. Today no one, not even the most ardent states'
rights advocate, seriously contests the preeminence of federal constitutional law in determining how state criminal investigations and
trials should proceed. Of course, this acquiescence was not immediate; in the 1960s, the Court was harshly criticized for usurping
powers that had previously belonged to the states. But the efforts
to undo the Warren Court's work-to overrule cases like Mapp,
Malloy, and Miranda (and even to impeach Earl Warren)-failed.
Justice Harlan's suggestion that incorporated rights might have a
different, less intrusive meaning in state cases than in federal cases
(a suggestion that might have allowed federal criminal procedure
law to continue to play a "background" role similar to that of federal constitutional law in other settings) was given short shrift. 49
By the mid-1970s, Court opinions no longer mentioned the possibility that federal constitutional law might not constitute the law
of criminal procedure, or that it might not mean the same thing in
state and federal cases.
This enormous shift in perspective on the role of federal criminal
48See Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), and its progeny.
4 See Williams v Florida, 399 US 78, 117 (1970) (Harlan concurring in the result and
dissenting in Baldwin v New York, 399 US 66 (1970)) (arguing that Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial could be interpreted differently in state and federal cases).
By 1972, only one member of the Court, Justice Powell, was willing to adhere to Justice
Harlan's view in Williams. See Apodaca v Oregon, 406 US 404 (1972);Jobnsonv Louisiana, 406
US 356 (1972). The last opinions explicitly opposing "jot for jot" incorporation of federal
constitutional rights in state cases were those of Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, in Crist v Bretz, 437 US 28 (1978), and Ballew v Georgia, 435
US 223 (1978).
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procedure law in state criminal cases occurred so gradually that
we have tended to overlook its implications for the law of federal
remedies. Among the foundational premises for the law of federal
courts, and for habeas law in particular, is the assumption that
federal law is in some sense foreign to state courts-that it exerts
its presence only rarely, and that it operates by trumping an existing body of state law that otherwise governs the relevant state
action. This premise no longer holds true in criminal cases: there
is no clear, institutional line of demarcation between federal and
state law in criminal procedure. In those areas covered by federal
constitutional criminal procedure, there are not two sources of relevant law that must be interpreted and applied by state courts in
criminal cases, but only one body of law that applies to such cases:
the law of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, as defined
by the Supreme Court, and as refined and applied by state and
lower federal courts alike.
Indeed, in an important sense, the law of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments-our detailed, national Code of Criminal
Procedure-today "belongs" to state courts as much as it does to
their federal counterparts. Whether or not they agree with it, state
judges no longer experience this body of federal law as alien or
foreign. Instead, state courts deal with federal criminal procedure
law the same way federal courts do-as the sole source of detailed
rules that govern their criminal dockets.
This is not to say, of course, that state and federal courts always
see eye-to-eye concerning the proper interpretation of the relevant
constitutional provisions. Nor is it to say that state judges are necessarily as competent or conscientious as federal judges, or that the
tasks of defining and applying these criminal procedure rules
should be left to state courts without federal court supervision and
review. Our point is only that, in the regular, day-to-day business
of applying law to the facts of cases, federal criminal procedure
law is virtually unique in the realm of federal constitutional law: it
genuinely occupies the field, and thus is of immediate and primary,
rather than remote and secondary, concern to state courts handling
criminal cases.
C. FEDERALISM, NATIONALISM, AND HABEAS: THREE PROBLEMS

We are now in a position to see what is wrong with the current
habeas debate. There are three main problems. The first has to do
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with the role federal constitutional law plays in criminal procedure.
The Federalism-Nationalism debate presupposes disputes between
federal and state law. Such disputes are, today, all'but absent from
criminal procedure; federal law is the only game in town. The
second problem is that Federalists and Nationalists alike tend to
ignore the special role of innocence and guilt in criminal justice.
The third problem concerns the deterrent function of many criminal procedure rights. All constitutional rights serve a deterrent
function, but that function substantially differs, and is implemented differently, in criminal procedure. We take up each of
these problems in turn.
1. Federal law and the need for afederalforum. Both sides in the

traditional habeas debate tend to view federal constitutional law as
a means of policing the day-to-day administration of state law.
Nationalists argue that criminal defendants have a powerful interest in adjudicating their federal rights in a federal forum: that forum
is one in which federal law is natural, whereas in state court, state
law is natural and federal law is foreign. Federalists, in rebuttal,
raise the argument of parity: litigants' federal interests will be protected because state judges are just as good at applying federal law
as are federal judges.
As far as criminal procedure is concerned, however, federal constitutional law is no more foreign or less natural in state court
than in federal court. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
completely dominate the field in both; state actors, including state
courts, look almost exclusively to these federal sources of criminal
procedure law50to govern the day-to-day administration of state
criminal cases.

Even the exceptions to this federal law occupation of the criminal
procedure field are, in a sense, not exceptions at all. Some states
have their own constitutional rules that go beyond federal law on
some issues; in these states, state law still plays an important,
though peripheral, role. 5 1 But these rules are "state law" only in
50This makes the traditional federal courts notion of entitlement to a federal forum lead,
in one sense, to a reductio ad absurdum: if the day-to-day administration of state criminal
cases is largely governed by federal constitutional lav, and if litigants raising federal claims
have a right to an adjudication of those federal claims in a federal forum, then (as a matter
of simple efficiency) shouldn't all state criminal prosecutions be conducted in the first instance in a federal court? Or at least be removable to federal court?
51See Symposium on State ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 15 Hastings Const L Q 391 (1988);
William J. Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev
489 (1977).
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an odd sense. State courts that adopt criminal procedure rules more
protective than the relevant federal constitutional doctrines commonly cite not state cases but Supreme Court dissents.52 That is,
state law criminal procedure decisions tend either to adopt federal
constitutional rules mechanically (making the state law meaningless) or to adopt a minority position from the relevant Court cases.
Either way, it is federal law that frames the debate and federal
decision makers who craft the relevant rules.
Moreover, whenever state constitutional law provides more
protection for a defendant than would the analogous federal
constitutional provision, there is no genuine conflict between
state and federal law. The relevant federal law-at least as applied to state actors in state criminal cases 53-does not "trump"
state law, because the criminal defendant simply gets the benefit
of the more protective state rule. Thus, such situations provide
no support at all for the traditional approach to habeas, which
assumes the existence of a true conflict between state and federal
law.
What has changed since the Revolution is that, for the most part,
state courts no longer look primarily to state law for the rules

5"

See, for example, Commonwealth v Upton, 476 NE2d 548 (Mass 1985) (on remand from

Supreme Court), adopting, under state constitution, view of dissenting opinion in Illinoisv
Gates, 462 US 213 (1983); State v Opperman, 247 NW2d 673 (SD 1976) (on remand from
Supreme Court), adopting, under state constitution, view of Supreme Court dissenting
opinion in Soutb Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364 (1976).
Justice Brennan, one of the most outspoken advocates of the use of state constitutions to
protect the rights of criminal defendants, has also been relatively forthright in his call
for state courts to base their state constitutional decisions on Supreme Court dissenting
opinions (many of those opinions, of course, written by him). For example, in a recent
article, he applauded the fact that "the state courts have responded with marvelous enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the constitutional gaps left by decisions of the Supreme Court majority." William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 NYU L Rev 535, 549
(1986).
" There may be a problem with applying such state constitutional protections against
federal actors, such as FBI or DEA agents, who routinely engage in criminal investigations
jointly with state and local law enforcement officers. For example, if federal agents conduct
a search that violates a state constitutional provision, but conforms with prevailing federal
law (eg., relevant Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions, or a federal statute authorizing the particular kind of search at issue), it is not clear whether the federal agent is bound
by the state provision when acting in furtherance of federal law enforcement interests. This
problem is a variation on the old "silver platter" problem that existed before the states were
held subject to the exclusionary rule in Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961). See Elkins v United
States, 364 US 206 (1960).
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that govern the day-to-day administration of criminal cases.5 4 This
means that even state supreme courts are, for the most part, no
longer in the business of defining their own state criminal procedure rules. They act, in criminal cases, not as common law courts
with plenary law-making authority, but as subordinate entities articulating and applying federal law within the confines of a large,
multilayered, combined federal-state criminal justice system. As
far as criminal procedure is concerned, state supreme courts operate as lower courts applying a common Nationalist code.
Today, federal criminal procedure law is as routine a part of
state criminal litigation as it is of federal litigation. For purposes
of applying the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, state
courts, like lower federal courts sitting in habeas, are in the business of trying to follow (or distinguish) the relevant Supreme Court
decisions.
Even more significant than this total federal occupation of the
field of criminal procedure law is the fact that state courts-and
everyone else, for that matter-have come to accept the dominance
of federal law. There are several likely explanations. First, the idea
of a national Code of Criminal Procedure seems to have worked
out pretty well in practice. Second, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have largely eliminated the perception, widespread during
the Warren Court era, that the federal law was much too prodefendant (or, at least, that the federal law was uniformly more
pro-defendant than the state law it supplanted). Finally, we've simply gotten used to the idea of Nationalism in criminal procedure
law-so much so that almost no one even thinks seriously, today,
about the alternative.
In short, the criminal procedure arena has changed completely
since the Revolution. Then, the battle involved competing sets of
laws-state and federal. In the midst of that battle, habeas served
as the Supreme Court's most powerful weapon, allowing it ultimately to prevail in reshaping the criminal justice systems of the
states. During that difficult and painful period of transition, when
federal law was seen by most state courts as a foreign invader
s The obvious exception is substantive criminal law, or the law of crimes and punishments, which is still mostly a matter of state law. But this exception is far less important
than it may seem: a glance through any set of state appellate reports reveals that most
disputed legal issues in criminal litigation, outside the special context of capital cases, have
to do with criminal procedure and not substantive criminal law.
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displacing entrenched state law, it made sense to think about habeas issues in terms of the Federalism-Nationalism debate.
Today, there is no debate over whether most criminal procedure
law should be state or federal. Instead, the debate is all about the
content of the federal law. State courts may still resist federal crimial procedure law-but whenever they do, it is not because the
law is federal, but because they think the law is too pro-defendant.
Today's criminal procedure debate, in other words, is the same
debate that is inherent in any system of criminal justice, whether
or not that system is unitary.
It is pointless to worry about the traditional federal courts values
in such a setting. If the relevant governing law is totally federal,
and everyone accepts it as such, why should anyone defer to a
decision of a state court qua state court? And if federal law is as
natural to state courts as to their federal counterparts, why should
anyone have a right to a decision by a federal court qua federal
court? In criminal procedure law, the concept of institutional allegiance-the foundation for the traditional federal courts approach-is a relic.
This view of the institutional relationship between state courts
and federal criminal procedure law is quite separate from the question whether all, or most, state courts make decisions on criminal
procedure issues that are just as good as those made by their federal
counterparts. (For what it's worth, we think that they often do
not.) It does, however, bear on the parity debate. In the criminal
procedure context, the relevant question is not whether all, or
most, state judges are as good as federal judges at applying federal
law-it is pointless to ask that question, since no matter what the
answer, applying federal law will continue to be the bulk of their
job in state criminal cases. The important question is, instead,
whether habeas review of state court decision making on issues of
federal law, under certain kinds of habeas rules and procedures,
will significantly increase the protection of the values that federal
criminal procedure law is designed to protect.
The relevant question, in other words, involves the proper role
of habeas within the overall system by which federal criminal procedure rights are enforced in state criminal cases. In the criminal
procedure context, we should stop thinking about state courts and
habeas courts as if they belonged to two separate legal systems.
There is only one criminal justice system, enforcing one set of
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criminal procedure
rights, and that system includes both state and
55

federal courts.
2. Drawingdistinctions among rights-theprimacy of innocence. The

most important concern of the criminal justice system is the protection of innocent defendants. Innocent defendants who are imprisoned suffer a horrible injustice that cries out for correction. All
constitutional violations are important, but nowhere is the remedial
role of habeas so important as in the case of an innocent person.56
There is little dispute about this point. Yet the conventional
approach to habeas does not easily accommodate such a consideration. Within federal courts law, the content of the particular federal right to be enforced is mostly beside the point. All federal
rights are supreme, and so warrant federal enforcement to the same
extent-though the extent will vary depending on one's own views
about federalism, comity, and parity. Thus, under the prevailing
approach, the innocence of a habeas petitioner usually is "irrelevant," because it is unrelated to the primary questions of federal
courts law: Should access to a federal forum be provided in order
to vindicate federal rights, or can state courts be trusted to enforce
those rights?
Of course, it is hardly novel to suggest that innocence ought to
matter in habeas, or that some rights should be treated differently
from others. Judge Friendly long ago suggested as much,5 7 and
Stone v Powell58 (which essentially barred relitigation of Fourth
Amendment claims on habeas) implemented his idea by differentiating one particular kind of non-innocence-related right from other
rights. Since Stone, some individual Justices have espoused, in one
form or another, the idea that distinctions should be drawn between different constitutional claims based on whether they go to
55 This same basic observation led another commentator, over ten years ago, to propose
replacing the present system of federal habeas review of state criminal cases with federal
appellate review (either in the present federal courts of appeal or in a new U.S. Court of
Appeals for the State Circuit). See Daniel J. Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of
State Criminal Cases, 44 Ohio State LJ 273 (1983).
56This proposition is arguably anchored in the habeas statute. The statute directs courts
to dispose of petitions "as law and justice require." 28 USC § 2243. To the extent that the
injustice of punishing innocents is especially acute, this language would seem to require
that innocence receive some weight in habeas doctrine.
57Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments,38 U
Chi L Rev 142 (1970).
" 428 US 465 (1976).
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the basic justice of the defendant's conviction. 9 Yet most habeas
opinions-written by "conservatives" and "liberals" alike-have
minimized the significance of innocence in habeas law. Stone itself
is now an orphan; this past Term, the Court once again refused to
extend it beyond Fourth Amendment claims.6 ° The law of procedural default has been framed without regard to the nature of the
defendant's claim, the sole exception being the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception, an exception drawn so narrowly it
63
seems never to apply. 6 So too with retroactivity, 62 exhaustion,
and abuse of the writ. 6' In all these areas the judicial debate is
between those who argue for comity and federalism (and believe
that state judges are the equal of their federal counterparts), and
those who attach great weight to vindicating federal rights in a
federal forum (and believe that state judges are not to be trusted). The
accuracy of particular guilty verdicts seems little more than a detail.
This pattern of treating all constitutional rights alike might make
sense in other enforcement settings, because elsewhere in constitu59 justices Powell, O'Connor, and Stevens have expressed this view. See Kuhlmann v
Wilson, 477 US 436, 448 & n 8 (1986) (Powell for a plurality); Withrow v Williams, 113 S
Ct 1745, 1758 (1993) (O'Connor concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rose v Lundy,
455 US 509, 543 (1982) (Stevens dissenting); Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S Ct 1710, 1723
(1993) (Stevens concurring). See also Reed v Farley, 62 USLW 3356 (US S Ct No 93-5418,
argued Mar 28, 1994) (involving whether Stone v Powell should extend to violations of
Interstate Agreement on Detainers).
60 Withrow v Williams, 113 S Ct 1745 (1993). But see Reed v Farley (cited in note 59).
61 See note 84.
62 Under Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), "new rules" may be declared or applied on
habeas only if they fit one of two exceptions: (1) new rules placing certain conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law to proscribe, such as the flag-burning case, Texas vJobnson,
491 US 397 (1989); or (2) "watershed" new rules of criminal procedure "without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." See Teague, 489 US at 313.
This second exception, although related to "innocence," is defined categorically; the Court
has not yet recognized a case-specific "innocence" exception to Teague's general nonretroactivity principle, although such an exception has been suggested by at least a few
commentators. See, e.g., Ellen Boshkoff, Resolving Retroactivity after Teague v. Lane, 65 Ind
L J 651 (1990); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should
Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 BYU L Rev 183, 208 n 111.
63 The test for whether a petitioner must go back to state court has no "innocence"
component; rather, the law looks to whether the claim has been properly raised in state
court. See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982).
4 "Abuse of the writ" doctrine covers cases in which a defendant raises a claim on a
second federal habeas petition that might have been raised in his first petition. The law in
such cases is essentially the same as in procedural default doctrine: the defendant must show
"cause" for failing to raise the claim earlier, and "prejudice" from the failure. See MeCleskey
v Zant, 111 S Ct 1454 (1991). The only sense in which this test has anything to do with
"innocence" is that, like the test for procedural default in state court, it includes a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception.
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tional litigation the remedy awarded often reflects differences in
the value of the constitutional claim. In a Section 1983 damages
action, the degree of the plaintiff's injury determines the amount
of damages; in actions for injunctive relief, the scope of the injunction is designed to remedy (or prevent) the relevant wrong. Different liability rules for different constitutional claims are unnecessary, because differences in plaintiffs' injuries are already taken
into account at the remedy stage. And differences in levels of damages or breadth of injunctive relief (not to mention levels of attorneys' fees) may also correspond, albeit only roughly, to differences
in the social value of the claims. Constitutional claims that generate
million-dollar damage awards usually have greater value to society-meaning that it is worth more to society to have the claims
brought, the victims compensated, and the violators punishedthan constitutional claims that generate thousand-dollar awards.
The penalty for the violation is thus likely to be at least roughly
proportionate to the wrong done by the violator. (And where that
is not so, punitive damages and attorneys' fees are available to
correct the imbalance.) Remedies are the device for separating constitutional violations that are more harmful, or more socially important, from violations that are less so. This sorting process is far
from perfect,65 but it probably functions well enough that Friendlystyle lines are unnecessary in most settings.
Habeas is different. The remedy for all successful habeas petitioners (except those challenging only their sentences-a group of
petitioners who are almost never successful, outside of capital cases)
is the same, regardless of the constitutional violation. Petitioners
with winning claims have their convictions vacated (usually with
the allowance of another trial, although if evidence has gone stale
or the case is not important enough to the prosecutor, habeas relief
may mean release). There is no grading of relief. The petitioner
who may well be innocent is treated no differently from the petitioner who is very likely guilty. This means that if claims are not
separated at the liability stage-that is, when the habeas court
" Professor Jeffries has pointed out that there are some important categories of Section
1983 litigation where the harm caused by the constitutional violation is not a good proxy for
social interest in seeing the violation punished. John C. Jeffries, Jr., DamagesforConstitutional
Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in ConstitutionalTorts, 75 Va L Rev 1461, 1470-84
(1989). Our point is only that those categories are the exception rather than the rule; ordinarily, damages can be expected to track social injury fairly well.
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determines whether to grant any relief-they will not be separated
at all. 6 To put it differently, elsewhere in constitutional litigation
the kind and severity of the victim's harm is reflected in the choice
(money, declaratory or injunctive relief) and extent of the remedy.
In habeas that is impossible. Guilt and innocence must either be
taken into account when deciding whether to grant relief, or ignored altogether. And if guilt and innocence really are central to
criminal justice, that centrality ought to be reflected in habeas law.
Prior to the constitutionalization of the day-to-day rules of criminal procedure, this was a minor problem. Before 1961, few federal
constitutional claims were available to state criminal defendants;
the only realistic avenue for habeas relief was a due process claim.
But due process claims were granted only in extreme cases of fundamental injustice, meaning that most successful claims probably
involved a likely-to-be-erroneous verdict. 67 In other words, refusing to treat innocence-related claims differently on habeas at the
time of Brown v Allen 68 may have made sense, because successful
habeas claims so often were innocence-related. The creation of
detailed rules governing police and prosecutorial behavior ensures
that this is no longer so. Today, constructing the law of habeas
without reference to innocence and guilt means ignoring the central
point of the criminal justice system.
3. Deterrence and criminal procedure. A major concern with any
remedy for constitutional violations is its ability to deter future
'Harmless error rules of the sort at issue in Brecbt v Abrabamson, 113 S Ct 1710 (1993),
do not alter the point. Harmless error review ensures that the defendant's claim is plausibly
related to the outcome of the proceeding. (The test under Brecbt is "whether the error 'had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Id at 1722,
quoting Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 776 (1946).) But this relation to the outcome
can be fairly tenuous or quite strong; relief is the same in either event. More important,
this relation to the outcome need not have anything to do with the fundamental justice of
the outcome. For example, improper police interrogation may affect the outcome of the
defendant's trial by inducing the defendant to confess. But if the confession is credible (that
is, if it is corroborated by other reliable evidence), then a conviction may nevertheless be
"just." At the very least, conviction in such a case must be far more "just," as a relative
matter, than conviction of a factually innocent defendant.
67Consider two examples. The first is police interrogation law, where defendants could
obtain relief only if their confession was "involuntary," and findings of involuntariness
tended to occur in cases of serious physical abuse of suspects. Such cases are, of course,
precisely where it is most likely that the confession is false. The second is right-to-counsel
doctrine, where the law did not require state-appointed counsel absent a showing of some
special need by the defendant. See Betts v Brady, 316 US 455 (1942). This meant, in practice,
that a defendant had to show a substantial likelihood that he was innocent in order to make
out a viable right-to-counsel claim.
68 344 US 443 (1953).
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violations. Habeas is, in this sense, no different from Section 1983
or the law of constitutional injunctions: one of the primary goals
of habeas law should be to deter violations of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments. But deterrence works differently in habeas. The federal rights enforced through habeas arise primarily
(although not exclusively) in criminal cases. This fact has two implications that distinguish habeas from other remedies for constitutional violations.
First, alleged violations of criminal procedure rights are much
more likely to be litigated than other alleged constitutional violations. A would-be plaintiff with a possible Section 1983 claim must
initiate the proceedings herself if she wants relief; this means finding a lawyer and proceeding through the process to trial if the
defendants choose not to settle. The only tangible incentive for
doing so is a possible damages award, and such awards are usually
quite small.69 A criminal defendant, on the other hand, is forced
to defend himself against charges the state has initiated, and if, as
is often the case, he cannot afford a lawyer, one is given to him
free of charge. Moreover, the tangible incentive for pressing the
claim is avoiding criminal punishment-a far bigger incentive than
most damages awards-and the same incentive applies to any claim
that may obtain the defendant's release.
This point has important deterrence consequences. Elsewhere
in constitutional law, much official misconduct goes unnoticed (or
at least unlitigated) and hence unpunished. Preserving access to
federal court, and providing a system of remedies that includes
potentially generous attorneys' fees, is thus critically important: if
most violations are swept under the rug, the system must take very
seriously the few claims that come to light through litigation. But
in the criminal justice system, violations are constantly litigated in
state courts, 70 because the litigants (criminal defendants) both have
69In a study of constitutional tort litigation in three federal districts in a one-year period
in the early 1980s, Professors Schwab and Eisenberg found that the average total recovery
(including attorneys' fees) in successfully litigated cases was $30,480. The median recovery
was only $8,000. These figures include only cases taken to trial; the figures for settled cases
are presumably a good deal lower. By comparison, in the same districts, the average recovery
in non-constitutional tort cases against the United States was $77,300, and the median
recovery was $20,000. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional
Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73
Cornell L Rev 719, 736-38 (1988).'
" For example, suppression motions are filed in approximately one-tenth of all state-court
criminal cases. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 1983 Am Bar Found Res J 585, 594. This makes constitutional litigation in the
course of state criminal proceedings vastly more frequent than constitutional tort litigation:
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strong incentives to raise claims and bear minimal costs. It follows
that the proportion of, say, Miranda violations that spawn suppression motions in state court must be far higher than the proportion
of First Amendment violations that lead to Section 1983 litigation.
(It also follows that there will be many more bogus Miranda claims,
since criminal defendants have such strong incentives to raise
claims, and they bear few costs when the claims are denied.) In
short, habeas review supplements a state criminal justice system
in which most constitutional violations are likely to be raised, while
Section 1983 litigation is, in most settings, the sole (and infrequently used) path to adjudication of constitutional claims.
Second, habeas litigation of federal criminal procedure issues is
invariably one-sided. Habeas courts review claims that the constitutional rights of defendants were not adequately protected in the
state courts, but they cannot review claims by prosecutors that
federal rights were erroneously overprotected by the state courts,
thus leading to the defendant's acquittal.
The habeas literature has ignored this point, but its deterrent
impact may be quite substantial. As Professor Kate Stith has explained, one-sided appellate review of many issues in criminal litigation skews the resolution of those issues at trial: trial courts tend
to give defendants the benefit of the doubt on, say, contested jury
instructions, because a pro-government error can mean reversal,
while a pro-defendant error is usually unreviewable. 7 ' Habeas litigation is even more likely to produce this skewing effect. Prosecutors may sometimes appeal pro-defendant errors committed by
state courts within the state court system: in some states, for example, the suppression of evidence can be appealed by the government
before trial. And erroneous legal rulings that overturn a guilty
verdict at trial or in an intermediate appeals court (if based on
any ground other than insufficiency of the evidence) are generally
appealable by the government. On habeas, however, the government cannot seek to overturn any adverse state court decision.
Thus, to a greater extent than with any other federal remedy for
constitutional violations, the threat of habeas relief must, at the
one study concluded that, nationwide, only about 2,000 constitutional tort actions are filed
in federal court each year against police officers. Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev
at 735 (cited in note 69).
" See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Errorin CriminalCases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry
in the Right to Appeal, 57 U Chi L Rev 1, 18-24 (1990).
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to push state courts toward greater protection of fedmargin, tend
72

eral rights.
These two observations suggest that, in the context of criminal
procedure, a little deterrence goes a long way. Whatever opportuni-

ties may exist for habeas relitigation of federal constitutional
claims, those opportunities will likely be used by state prisoners
to a much greater extent than corresponding opportunities will be

used by ordinary civil litigants. Moreover, habeas follows a state
criminal process in which federal constitutional violations are more

likely to come to light than elsewhere in constitutional litigation.
And the one-sided nature of habeas review will tend to maximize

the effect of pushing state courts in the direction of protecting the
relevant federal rights.
II.

HABEAS AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEM

What would the law of habeas corpus look like if one were
to reconstruct it in light of the nature of contemporary criminal
procedure doctrine? As with any other procedural device, the answer depends on one's views concerning the costs and benefits of
the procedure. In the current system, the principal cost of habeas-leaving aside, for reasons we have explained, the supposed
intrusion on state sovereignty-is the suspension of finality. Habeas occupies the time and energy of courts and prosecutors (and,
in some instances, state-paid counsel for petitioners), and hence
delays the conclusion of the proceedings." These costs are not
massive, but they are real, and should not be incurred unnecessarily.

The benefits must be assessed in light of the goals of constitutional criminal procedure, for that is the law that habeas enforces.
72Indeed, the one-sided nature of habeas suggests (independent of our arguments about
the problems with the traditional federal courts approach to habeas) that Professor James
Liebman's recently asserted analogy between habeas and direct appeal is inapt. See Liebman, 92 Colum L Rev 1997 (cited in note 2). The Court has regularly reviewed on appeal
claims by the government that state courts erroneously over-protected criminal defendants
under federal law; no such federal court review, on the other hand, is available at the request
of the government via a habeas petition.
73We do not count privately paid defense counsel, because the defendant can make for
himself the judgment whether that cost is worth the possible benefit. But, even if he has
private counsel, the defendant still does not internalize most of the costs he imposes on the
prosecutor and court.
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We posit three goals: (1) that only the guilty be punished; (2) that
police, prosecutors, and judges treat suspects and defendants fairly;
and (3) that federal courts have adequate opportunities to make
federal law. The key to any sensible reform of habeas law is to
recognize that these goals need not all be achieved in the same
way. Different kinds of constitutional claims may require different
habeas rules.
A. PREVENTING UNJUST PUNISHMENT-THE PROTECTION
OF INNOCENCE

As we have said, the possibility that a criminal defendant might
be innocent of the crime for which he is being punished currently
plays only a small role in the adjudication of his habeas petition.
There are two ways to fix this: habeas courts can focus on the
nature of the defendant's constitutional claim, or they can focus on
prejudice to the individual defendant. We think the second approach is better than the first. The reasons are anchored in the
nature of the rights established by the law of constitutional criminal
procedure.
Stone v Powell74 represents an example of the first approach. Stone
effectively removed Fourth Amendment claims from habeas, partly
on the ground that such claims were unconnected with the guilt/
innocence determination.7 5 When Stone was decided, it was widely
viewed as the first step toward a broad restructuring of habeas,
with the Court categorizing all constitutional criminal procedure
claims as either innocence-related or not, and treating the former
category more favorably on habeas than the latter. Instead, Stone
has been limited to Fourth Amendment claims. Just this past year,
in Withrow v Williams, 76 the Court declined to apply Stone to Miranda claims; Justice Souter's majority opinion in Withrow sug77
gested that Stone is not subject to further expansion.
Though Withrow may have come as a surprise to some observers,
we think the Court got it exactly right: the categorical-"innocence"
74428 US 465 (1976).
" Indeed, the point is stronger: criminal defendants with valid Fourth Amendment claims

are more likely to be guilty than defendants as a whole, because the evidence they are seeking
to suppress is by definition incriminating.
76113 S Ct 1745 (1993).
77Id at 1750-55. But see Reed v Farley (cited in note 59).
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approach of Stone does not work (at least not beyond the special
category of Fourth Amendment claims) because it does not fit the
general nature of criminal procedure law. In an across-the-board
Stone regime in which innocence-related claims could be raised on
habeas but other claims could not, Miranda claims, for example,
would presumably be "out" and ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, to take another example, would be "in." After all, Miranda
aims primarily at deterring police misbehavior even if such misbehavior might turn up reliable evidence of crime, but if the defendant had an incompetent lawyer the guilt/innocence determination
seems inherently untrustworthy.
This conclusion is, however, quite problematic. Improper police
interrogation tactics can lead to false confessions.78 And ineffective
assistance claims need not have anything to do with the guilt/
innocence determination: in Kimmelman v Morrison,79 the Court held
that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not seeking
to suppress highly probative incriminating evidence that apparently was illegally seized."
These examples illustrate a general point: most criminal procedure rights protect multiple values, and they protect different values in different cases. Ineffective assistance claims are usually about
ensuring reliable verdicts, but that is not always so. Mirandaclaims
may primarily serve to deter police misbehavior of a kind that is
unlikely to convict innocent defendants, yet they sometimes bear
strongly on the reliability of a confession (and hence of any subsequent conviction).81 The Stone approach tries to categorize rights
as innocence-related or not. But most criminal procedure rights do
not fit neatly into either of Stone's boxes.
The alternative is to look not to the kind of claim the defendant
78For one recent example, see Roger Parloff, False Confessions, in American Lawyer 58,

59-60 (May 1993).
'9 477 US 365 (1986).
8 Id at 383-91.
81 There are many other examples. The set of constitutional rules surrounding peremptory
challenges in jury selection seems designed, in large part, to protect the interests of potential
jurors in avoiding discrimination-an interest that has no necessary relation to the reliability
of guilty verdicts. Yet in part, those rules also aim to prevent the government from "stacking"
the jury in its favor by excluding groups that might be favorable to the defense, a goal that
obviously has a great deal to do with the guilt-innocence determination. See Nancy J. King,
Postconviction Review ofJury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects ofJuror Race onjury Decisions,
92 Mich L Rev 63, 75-100 (1993) (detailing the effects of race on jury decision making).
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raises, but to whether the defendant can show in his case that the
reliability of the guilt/innocence determination is seriously at issue.
This was the original idea behind the "fundamental miscarriage of
justice" exception to the procedural default rule of Wainwright v
Sykes. 82 Sykes held that a defendant may not raise a defaulted claim
on habeas unless he can show both cause for the default and prejudice resulting from it. The exception for fundamental miscarriage
of justice permits habeas review of a defaulted claim, even without
the required showing of cause and prejudice, if the defendant can
83
show that he is probably innocent.
The miscarriage of justice exception has the great virtue of not
requiring the categorization of criminal procedure claims: in effect,
a claim is "innocence-related" if a defendant can link it to a strong
enough showing of innocence in his case, but not otherwise. This
avoids the categorical over- and underinclusiveness of Stone. On
the other hand, the exception seriously underprotects innocence.
In practice, the burden of showing probable (more likely than not)
innocence turns out to be too much to bear; the exception has
become a virtual nullity, cited as evidence of the Court's concern
with protecting innocence but almost never applied.8 4
The idea behind the miscarriage of justice exception is sound.
But the Court's reluctance to distinguish among different habeas
cases has led it to cabin the exception too severely. A defendant
who can demonstrate a "reasonable probability" of innocence-not
that he is "probably" (more likely than not) innocent, but that he
"may well be" innocent, or can raise "substantial doubt" about his
guilt-has made the kind of showing that should seriously undermine one's faith in the justice of the verdict in his case. 8" Whenever
"2433 US 72 (1977).
8' See Murray v Carrier,477 US 478, 495-96 (1986).
" In the wake of Carrier,a few cases actually found the miscarriage of justice exception
applicable, though on grounds that went well beyond probable innocence. See Power v
Johnson, 678 F Supp 1195, 1196-97 (EDNC 1988) (finding miscarriage of justice based on
defense attorney incompetence); Williams v Lane, 645 F Supp 740, 748 (ND Ill 1986) (finding
miscarriage of justice based on a showing of egregious prosecutorial misbehavior). The
Supreme Court has since emphasized that only more-likely-than-not innocence will suffice
to bring a petitioner's claim within the exception. Dugger v Adams, 489 US 401, 412 n 6
(1989). Accordingly, the exception as it stands today is very narrow indeed.
85 This standard-essentially something midway between beyond a reasonable doubt and
preponderance of the evidence-already exists in several areas of criminal procedure doctrine. See, for example, Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 693-96 (1984) (prejudice
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such a showing of potential innocence is coupled with a claim
of constitutional violation, it seems unacceptable to withhold
habeas review of the constitutionality of the defendant's conviction.
We therefore propose that one branch of habeas law be premised
directly on the recognition that habeas can provide a valuable layer
of protection against the unjust punishment of innocent defendants. Under this first track of habeas review, a "reasonable probability of innocence" standard would apply to all constitutional
claims (not simply defaulted or otherwise procedurally deficient
claims), so that any defendant could obtain habeas review of the
constitutionality of his conviction by (1) demonstrating a "reasonable probability" that he is innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted, and (2) alleging a constitutional violation that resulted
in his erroneous conviction. If the habeas court finds that a constitutional violation occurred, and that as a result the defendant was
convicted even though he may well be innocent, habeas relief
should be granted. If the defendant fails either to make the required
showing of innocence or to prevail on the merits of his constitutional claim, habeas relief under this first track of habeas review
should be denied.
Our approach would lead to habeas review on the merits of all
claims that the government failed to disclose material exculpatory
evidence, since our proposed "reasonable probability of innocence"
standard is the same as that for showing "materiality" under existing Brady doctrine.86 It would also mean habeas review of all
innocence-related ineffective assistance of counsel claims: once
again, the standard is the same. 87 And it would mean habeas review
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel cases); United States v Bagley, 473 US 667,
678-83 (1985) (plurality opinion) (prejudice standard for claims of prosecutorial failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence). In these areas, the law has sought to craft a standard that
provides relief when one's "confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding has been "undermine[d]," Strickland, 466 US at 694, but not otherwise. And in all, the Court has been quite
careful not to use either "reasonable doubt" or "preponderance" language in formulating
the relevant standard.
8' See Bagley, 473 US at 682 (plurality opinion) ("The evidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different").
" See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984) ("The defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different").
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of. all Jackson v Virginia claims, which go directly to the sufficiency
of the evidence of the defendant's guilt."8
With respect to most other constitutional claims, the "innocence"
standard we propose would, under this first branch of habeas law,
create an additional prerequisite to obtaining habeas review and
possible relief. But the standard would actually benefit some defendants, since such a showing would justify habeas review of the
merits of the defendant's federal claims without regard to any possible procedural deficiencies in state court. The contrary rule in
existence today 89 rests on the notion that the state's interests in
finality and the enforcement of procedural rules outweigh the interest of a potentially innocent defendant in avoiding punishment.
This balance (with which we disagree in any event) reflects the
current law's preoccupation with federalism concerns, a preoccupation that is out of place with the wholly nationalized body of law
that state courts apply to resolve criminal procedure disputes.
Two other aspects of our proposed "innocence" habeas track
deserve mention. First, habeas review under this "innocence" track
would be de novo, with respect to both legal and mixed law-andfact issues. We would not restrict habeas petitioners to case law
that existed at the time of their state court trials and direct appeals,
nor would we require habeas courts to defer to the prior rulings
of state courts on legal or mixed issues. A defendant who can
demonstrate a "reasonable probability of innocence," coupled with
whatever the habeas court finds to be a constitutional violation
under prevailing federal law at the time of the habeas adjudication,
should get relief. The reasonableness of the state court's rulings
under the federal law as it then existed is irrelevant, because the
goal of habeas relief on this "innocence" track is not to send signals
to the state courts but to prevent injustice to the defendant. Whatever impact Teague v Lane ° should have on "non-innocence" habeas
"' See Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979) ("[T]he relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). This
standard, of course, is much more restrictive than our proposed "reasonable probability of
innocence" standard. Thus, habeas review of any credibleJacksonclaim would undoubtedly
be de novo under our proposal-a Jackon claim could not possibly be credible unless the
defendant was able to make a strong showing of innocence.
' Today, in cases involving defaulted claims, habeas petitioners must also show "cause"
for the default. See Wainwrigbt v Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977).
'0 489 US 288 (1989).
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claims (a question we will address in the next section), where a
"reasonable probability of innocence" exists the Teague rule should

not apply.
Second, we would not preclude habeas relief even for a "naked"
innocence claim of the kind that was presented to the Court last
Term in Herrerav Collins.9 The petitioner in Herrerasought habeas

relief simply on the ground that he was innocent. He alleged no
constitutional violation. Herrera's claim was factually implausible, 92 so the Court did not need to rule out the possibility of such

claims in order to deny Herrera habeas review and potential relief.93 But in our view, habeas petitioners who can make a suffi-

ciently strong showing of innocence, even without a separate constitutional violation, have negated the only good reason to keep

them in prison (or, as in Herrera's case, to execute them). Relief
should follow under the Due Process Clause, even if no other constitutional right is implicated.
Of course, there is much room for disagreement about what the
91113 S Ct 853 (1993).
92 Herrera was arrested on suspicion of killing two police officers, David Rucker and
Enrique Carrisalez, in two separate shootings that occurred minutes apart along a highway
in south Texas in late 1981. Carrisalez, before his death, identified Herrera as the person
who had shot him. Another witness to the Carrisalez shooting also identified Herrera as
the shooter, and identified the shooter's car as one that was registered to Herrera's live-in
girlfriend. The witness testified that there was only one person in the car at the time of the
Carrisalez shooting.
When Herrera was arrested, he was carrying a handwritten letter strongly implying his
guilt in the Rucker killing. He was also carrying the keys to his girlfriend's car. His Social
Security card was found alongside Rucker's patrol car. Blood and hair evidence tended to
corroborate Herrera's presence at the scene of the Rucker murder. After being convicted
of Carrisalez's murder and sentenced to death, Herrera pled guilty to the murder of Rucker.
Herrera's "newly discovered evidence" consisted of the affidavits of four persons. In 1990
and 1991, three of the four persons claimed for the first time that Herrera's brother, who
had died in 1984, had told them before his death that he and not Herrera was the true killer
of the two police officers. The fourth person, Herrera's brother's son, claimed that he was
present at the time and place of the shootings and that Herrera's brother was the true killer.
All of these facts were detailed in the Court's opinion, and relied upon for the conclusion
that "this showing of innocence falls far short of that which would have to be made in order
to trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist." 113
S Ct at 870.
93Indeed, a majority of the Justices indicated, in separate concurring and dissenting
opinions, that a strong enough showing of even "naked" innocence might warrant habeas
review and relief. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion suggests that
the Court might bar such claims altogether: "Federal habeas review of state convictions has
traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of
the underlying state criminal proceedings ....
History shows that the traditional remedy
for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new
trial motion, has been executive clemency." 113 S Ct at 869.
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proper standard for such "naked" innocence claims ought to be.
Presumably it should be harder for a defendant to obtain habeas
review by claiming innocence alone than by coupling an innocence
claim with a claim of a constitutional violation of a kind that might
have affected the reliability of the evidence or the accuracy of the
verdict. Absent such a violation, there is far less reason for the
habeas court to distrust the trial process that convicted the defendant. It follows that the showing necessary to obtain habeas review,
and potential relief, in such a case should be far stronger-perhaps
"more likely than not" innocence, or "clear and convincing evidence" of innocence. Both of these standards are fully consistent
with our proposed approach to habeas, for the Herrera issue involves not the proper scope of habeas, but the meaning of substantive due process. Whatever one defines as the nature of substantive due process in cases involving claims of "naked" innocence,
our "innocence" track of habeas law would implement that definition.
This leads to an important general caveat. Neither our proposal
nor any other change in habeas law can sufficiently protect innocent defendants if the underlying criminal procedure doctrine is
badly flawed. Some say, for example, that current ineffective assistance law is too restrictive, and that it is too hard for defendants
to make the needed showing of attorney incompetence, which
means that some innocent defendants cannot get relief because their
lawyers, though inept, were not inept enough. If this claim is
correct, then Sixth Amendment doctrine should be changed. But
either way, our proposal does a better job of protecting innocent
defendants by means of habeas review than does the existing
system.
In short, adopting the approach Judge Friendly proposed many
years ago-not as the exclusive route to habeas relief, but as one
option available to habeas petitioners-would make habeas a more
useful tool for preventing the most fundamental injustice the criminal justice system can produce. Currently, the unreliability of a
defendant's conviction can be remedied on habeas only if the state
court's decision was unreasonable under then-existing federal law,
and then only if the defendant's claims are not defaulted (or otherwise procedurally deficient) or if he can show "more-likely-thannot" innocence. Our proposed approach would add significantly
to the protection of innocent defendants, without adding to the
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complexity of habeas law (indeed, as we will show in Part III,
our approach would greatly simplify habeas doctrine). And our
approach would fit in well with the nature of criminal procedure
rights, which protect many values, of which innocence is the most
important.
B. DETERRING CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

Current habeas doctrine does a somewhat better job of fulfilling
the second major goal of criminal procedure law: deterring misconduct by relevant state actors. In particular, the line of habeas retroactivity decisions beginning with Teague v Lane shows promise of
developing into a sensible deterrence-based habeas doctrine. But
the doctrine has not reached fruition yet, and the recent decision
in Wright v West, 94 declining to adopt a "reasonableness" standard
of habeas review for state court decisions on mixed questions of
law and fact, indicates that the Court is not yet thinking clearly
about habeas's deterrence function.
That function is necessarily different from the deterrence role
played by other constitutional remedies. Section 1983 or Bivens
litigation can occur immediately after the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiffs need not exhaust other possible remedies, so there
is no procedural filter through which the claim must pass before it
gets to federal court. Federal habeas litigation, by contrast, always
occurs after a trial (or guilty plea) and direct appeal, and also after
any state collateral proceedings. And there are many, many more
state court criminal procedure decisions (including rulings on sup95
pression motions) than there are habeas decisions.
Given this unique procedural setting, it is unrealistic to think of
habeas as a significant direct deterrent of misconduct by state or
91 112 S Ct 2482 (1992).
95Of course, changes in habeas doctrine could alter this ratio, but not as much as one
might think: the number of habeas claims has not fluctuated substantially with changes in
habeas doctrine over the past twenty years or so. In 1970, the number of habeas petitions
filed by state prisoners was 9,063; this figure declined relatively steadily until 1977, when
it reached a low of 6,866; then it began to climb again, topping out at 10,545 in 1989. In
no single year between 1970 and 1989 did the number of petitions vary by more than 1,000,
in either direction, from the preceding year; and in only five of the nineteen years did the
number of petitions vary by more than 500, in either direction, from the preceding year.
See United States Department of Justice, Sourcebook of CriminalJusticeStatistics, Table 5.25
(1980); United States Department of Justice, Sourcebook of CriminalJustice Statistics, Table
5.55 (1990).
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local police and prosecutors. Those officials face a much greater
threat of lost convictions in state court than they will ever face in
habeas, and when habeas review does occur, it occurs later (sometimes much later) than sanctions applied by state courts. Police
officers, for example, are unlikely to change their behavior because
of what a federal habeas court might say about that behavior years
after they question a suspect.
There is an appropriate deterrence role for habeas to play, but
it is a role aimed more at state courts than at other state officials.
For state judges, particularly trial judges, the grant of habeas relief
resembles a reversal on appeal: the judge's decision is overturned
in a way that (at least in some cases) suggests error on the judge's
part, and if there are further proceedings the case usually returns
to the same judge's docket. To whatever extent appellate review
in general deters lower court judges from misapplying law, habeas
96
review should exert a similar deterrent effect on state judges.
Of course, state judges' rulings in turn deter state and local police
officers and prosecutors from misapplying federal law; that is the
theory on which the exclusionary rule and many other aspects of
criminal procedure rest. But this indirect deterrent impact on primary actors, like police officers and prosecutors, is not the same
as the direct deterrent impact of other federal remedies, such as
Section 1983 litigation. In the habeas context, the goal is to create
incentives for state courts carefully to scrutinize the conduct of
primary actors, and thereby to transmit the deterrent effects of
habeas review to those primary actors.
How can habeas law create those incentives? The temptation is
to play out the analogy to appellate review. On legal and mixed
law-and-fact questions, appellate courts reverse whenever they find
error. This plenary standard of review not only ensures correct

96The empirical evidence on this point is sketchy, but there seems to be little disagreement
among the members of the Supreme Court-regardless of their respective views about the
proper role of habeas-that habeas review, and the threat of reversal, can exert at least
some influence on the decisions of state judges. Perhaps the best available evidence in
support of this proposition is the simple observation that state courts rarely refuse to abide
by the legal rulings of the particular lower federal habeas courts that review their state
criminal cases, even though the state courts are not obligated to do so. See Robert Cover
and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L J
1035 (1977) (suggesting that state courts and lower federal habeas courts can engage in a
"dialogue" about the nature of federal rights, because state courts are not obligated to abide
by legal rulings of lower federal habeas courts).
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outcomes in particular cases;97 it also encourages lower court judges
to take "super-care" to avoid errors, by imposing a kind of strict
liability. Habeas law, some might argue, should do the same: provide for de novo review of legal or mixed law-and-fact decisions of
state courts with respect to federal constitutional claims.
But the incentive effects of de novo review on habeas are different from the incentive effects of de novo review in ordinary appeals. Recall that habeas review, to an even greater extent than
ordinary criminal appeals, is one-directional. Only state court errors that benefit the government can be the basis of habeas claims.
Apart from the Supreme Court's rare use of its certiorari jurisdiction, state court errors that benefit defendants are not subject to
any federal review at all.
State judges in criminal cases thus face asymmetric risks of reversal by federal courts. In this respect, they resemble individual defendants in Section 1983 actions. Most government officials get no
direct reward for acting properly, but risk damages liability if they
violate constitutional standards. The fear is that, as a consequence,
such officials will be overdeterred and will avoid close-to-the-line
behavior-officials will, for example, avoid making some good decisions in order to reduce the risk of liability for bad ones. 98 The
response of Section 1983 law to this problem is the qualified immunity defense, which generally protects state actors from damages
liability unless their conduct was clearly illegal. 99 By shifting the
liability standard from "violation" (strict liability) to "clear violation" (a form of negligence), qualified immunity doctrine reduces
overdeterrence.
State judges are in a similar position. Because of double jeopardy
doctrine, they face a much lower risk of reversal on direct appeal
for pro-defendant errors than for mistakes that favor the government. And they face no risk whatsoever of reversal on habeas for
pro-defendant errors. If state judges care whether their decisions
9 Though this is obviously a little artificial, since "correct" in this context means only
that which the appellate court holds.
I For the standard discussions of this point, see Jerry L. Mashaw, CivilLiabilityof Governmient Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 L & Contemp Probs 8, 29-33
(Winter 1978); Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 59-81
(Yale, 1983).
' See Anderson v Creigbton, 483 US 635, 640 (1987) (in order to defeat qualified immunity
defense, "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the defendant's conduct] must
be apparent").
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are reversed, this asymmetry should push their decisions marginally in favor of defendants.
This effect would not matter if the goal of criminal procedure
law were to minimize errors favoring the government. But there is
no deterrence-based reason to pursue such a goal. It is one thing to
let ten guilty people go free to avoid sending one innocent person
to prison. Basic principles of justice support tilting the risk of error
heavily in the defendant's favor. It is quite another thing to prefer
the mistaken suppression of ten (lawfully obtained) confessions by
guilty defendants to the mistaken admission of one reliable (yet
unconstitutionally obtained) confession into evidence. Assuming
that the confession is reliable, the demands of justice do not dictate
any particular allocation of errors with regard to Mirandaquestions.
That is why the burden of persuasion for Aliranda claims is not
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt or clear-and-convincing evidence, but
the preponderance standard.' 0 0
The logical solution for habeas doctrine is an analogue to qualified immunity doctrine: a rule requiring reversal on habeas only
when a state court ruling was not just wrong, but unreasonably
so-that is, when the decision was something other than a close
call. Indeed, the case for such a negligence-type rule is stronger in
the habeas context than in Section 1983 cases. Qualified immunity
in Section 1983 cases may produce substantial underdeterrence:
not only do Section 1983 defendants receive a favorable liability
standard, but the small number of Section 1983 cases suggests they
are unlikely to become defendants in the first place.' 0 ' This last
point is not true in the criminal procedure setting. The procedural
setting in which the claims are raised-criminal litigation brought
by the state, where the defendant receives appointed counsel, and
where valid constitutional claims may lead to immunity from punishment-suggests that police officers and prosecutors cannot
blithely flout criminal procedure rules in the belief that their violations will be overlooked. Violations of those rules are litigated in
state court, with great regularity. Giving "close-call" state court
decisions the benefit of the doubt on habeas would not change
that.
In short, there is a strong argument for a general "reasonableness" standard of review on habeas-that is, for not granting ha"0 Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 167-69 (1986).
'01See note 70 supra.
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beas relief unless the state court decision was unreasonable under
federal law at the time it was made. As we have explained, this
standard should not apply where the defendant can show a reasonable probability of innocence, for in such a case the potential for
an unjust outcome warrants habeas relief apart from any deterrence
concerns. But where deterrence alone is at stake, "reasonableness"
review on habeas should suffice.
This conclusion holds true even if state judges generally are not
the equal of federal judges, and even if some state judges sometimes
engage in bad faith efforts to evade federal law. If particular state
courts are either sloppy or inept, and if their incompetence manifests itself in plainly erroneous rulings in the government's favor,
then habeas relief will follow, even under a "reasonableness" standard. The same is true if particular state courts are sometimes
hostile to federal rights.
If, on the other hand, a particular state court makes a substantial
number of errors on both sides of the line in "close call" cases, we
can see no deterrence-based argument justifying habeas relief. A
pattern of evenly distributed mistakes in marginal cases is perfectly
consistent with properly functioning constitutional deterrence.
The only scenario that would undermine our proposed "reasonableness" standard would be if a state court systematically erred
in the government's favor in close cases. This scenario seems unlikely. The incentives to avoid reversal should, if anything, tend
to push state courts in the opposite direction. And hostility to
federal rights would likely manifest itself in plainly wrong rulings-the kind of rulings that habeas courts would, under our
proposal, overturn.
We therefore propose a second "track" of habeas law that would
use a "reasonableness" standard of review to achieve maximum
constitutional deterrence of state courts at minimum cost. Implementing this second track of habeas review would be easy; the
Court need only follow Teague v Lane10 2 to its logical conclusion.
Teague held that habeas review is ordinarily unavailable when
granting the habeas petitioner's claim would require the adoption
or application of a "new rule" of law."°3 The definition of "new
102489

US 288 (1989).

103Id at 310, 315-16. Although the lead opinion of Justice O'Connor in Teague was only

a plurality opinion, a majority of the Court has since adopted the views expressed in that
opinion. See, for example, Penry v Lynaugb, 492 US 302 (1989). We will henceforth, therefore, refer to Justice O'Connor's Teague opinion as if it were a majority opinion.
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rule" remains unclear, but recent decisions suggest that it encompasses any claim that a reasonable state judge could have rejected,
based on the federal law at the time. 1" Teague thus adopts a "benefit
of the doubt" or "reasonableness" habeas standard of review for
purely legal issues.
In Wright v West, 1°5 however, the Court failed to extend this
standard to mixed questions of law and fact (such as whether defense counsel was ineffective, or whether a confession was involuntary). The Court has not definitively resolved the issue, but several
Justices and many commentators have expressed alarm at the idea
of across-the-board "deference" to state court decisions on mixed
issues in habeas.1 °6 This alarm is unwarranted. Habeas courts
should not defer to state court decisions on mixed issues; such a
notion of "deference" would be based on the same archaic Federalist arguments that we contend ought to be rejected. Rather, the
real issue in cases like Wright v West is: what habeas standard of
review is necessary to deter state courts from misconstruing or
misapplying federal law? Given the frequency with which federal
claims arise in state court and the one-sidedness of habeas review
(and for the same reasons that support a qualified immunity defense
in Section 1983 cases), an across-the-board "reasonableness" habeas
standard of review, applicable to all issues, should ensure that state
judges apply federal constitutional standards, on average, just
about right. 107
104See Butler v McKellar, 494 US 407 (1990); Stringerv Black, 112 S Ct 1130 (1992);Joseph

L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 1989
Supreme Court Review 165.
"' 112 S Ct 2482 (1992).
106Id at 2493-98 (O'Connor, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, concurring in the judgment); id at 2498-2500 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment); Liebman, 92 Colum L Rev
at 2012-33 (cited in note 2).
107There is a category of cases that this approach does not catch: cases in which the
defendant never raises a valid constitutional claim because the government conceals the
evidence on which the claim rests. One might argue that habeas review is necessary in such
cases, notwithstanding the absence of any unreasonable state court decision, in order to
deter fraudulent behavior by the government. We think such an argument is mistaken.
At the outset, we note that many (perhaps most) claims of concealment would be viable
on habeas under our approach, because they involve claims of innocence. To take the most
common example, a claim that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence would
receive de novo review on habeas as long as "exculpatory" is defined in the ordinary sense.
So the question reduces to whether habeas review is necessary for deterrence reasons alone in
"concealment" cases.
That question can only be answered by considering the contexts in which the claims are
likely to arise. There are three major categories. The first is search and seizure cases where
the claim is that the officer lied in the suppression hearing. It is impossible to allow litigation
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C. FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL LAW

One final aspect of the criminal justice system needs to be taken
into account. In a system based on Nationalist criminal procedure
rules, someone must make those rules. That "someone" is, ultimately, the Supreme Court. If a particular body of rules, such as
those governing criminal procedure, is to be truly Nationalist, then
the ultimate lawmaking authority properly must reside within the
federal system. (This is so even if parity between state and federal
courts exists; it is all the more so if federal courts are generally
superior decision makers on federal issues.) There is a big difference between saying (as we do) that state and federal courts both
apply federal criminal procedure law as their own, and saying (as
we do not) that state courts should be given the authority to define,
in the end, the content of federal law.
The Supreme Court has a limited decisional capacity. The Court
may sometimes find itself incapable of ensuring, on its own, that
federal criminal procedure law will develop in a sufficiently Nationalist manner. When such a situation arises, the Court needs to
be able, in effect, to deputize an alternative federal lawmakernamely, the lower federal courts sitting in habeas-who can perform a supporting role in creating and implementing a Nationalist
body of law. That is essentially what happened in the 1960s: the
Court dramatically expanded the scope of habeas just as the Criminal Procedure Revolution picked up steam. For the purpose of
federal lawmaking, this expansion of habeas was appropriate, indeed probably necessary. Expansive habeas review of state criminal
cases allowed the lower federal courts to help the Court craft,
of these claims without in effect allowing litigation of all Fourth Amendment claims: litigation of "concealment" would turn out to be indistinguishable from relitigation of the merits,
since a decision that the officer lied is likely to be the same as a decision that the search
was illegal. And reasonableness review is sufficient as a deterrent of bad merits decisions.
The second category is police interrogation cases where, again, the claim is that the officer
lied at the suppression hearing. Here, the defendant has the relevant information at the
time of the state court proceeding-he is the one who was being interrogated. Thus, if the
government makes false claims, the defendant is in a position to challenge those claims in
the state court proceeding. The third category consists of grand jury discrimination claims
in which the evidence of discrimination may have been concealed by the relevant actors.
(Concealment is much less likely for petit jury selection, because defense counsel will ordinarily have the information needed to raise any available claims.) Here, the presence of
multiple concerned parties means both that successful concealment is unlikely and that there
is a reasonable prospect of non-criminal litigation raising the relevant claim. De novo habeas
review does not seem to us necessary in any of these cases.
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essentially from scratch, the detailed Nationalist code of criminal
procedure that we know today. 108
The need for federal lawmaking has been the basis of much
criticism of Teague doctrine. Teague bars habeas relief anytime a
petitioner's claim would require the adoption or application of a
"new rule"; commentators have noted (correctly) that this means
habeas courts are generally precluded from crafting such rules. 109
One can similarly object to the across-the-board "reasonableness"
standard of review (which is really just an extension of Teague) that
we advocate for our second track of habeas law. Does this sfandard
of review too severely limit federal lawmaking?
The answer is no. What must be remembered is that habeas, as
an alternative means of federal lawmaking, provides an opportunity
for the Supreme Court to obtain the help of the lower federal
courts when needed in performing a constitutional lawmaking role
that belongs, first and foremost, to the Court itself. If the Court
believes that it does not need the help, because it is confident in
the lawmaking abilities of the state courts as constrained and guided
by its own direct review, then that is the end of the argument.
The Court is the ultimate federal constitutional lawmaker; it is
entitled to decide whether or not to delegate its lawmaking authority. And, through the Teague line of cases, the Court has made
plain that it does not currently need or want the help of habeas
courts in shaping federal criminal procedure law.
Nor, for what it's worth, does the Court's judgment seem unreasonable. In the end, the need is for adequate opportunities for
federal lawmaking, not limitless opportunities. And adequacy depends on context, especially on the scope and stability of the law
already in place. In the 1960s and 1970s, much of federal criminal
procedure law was a blank slate. Expansive habeas review, across
the board, allowed the creation of the detailed federal criminal
procedure rules that exist today. But those rules do exist today;
the need for constitutional lawmaking has declined substantially.
The Fourth Amendment, Miranda, grand jury discrimination,
burden-of-proof instructions-all these areas, and many more,
consist of relatively mature lines of doctrine. Today, in each of
1 See Cover and Aleinikoff, 86 Yale LJ 1035 (cited in note 96).
109See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731 (1991); Hoffmann, 1989 Supreme Court Review 165
(cited in note 104); Weisberg, 81 J Crim L & Criminol 9 (cited in note 2); Woolhandler, 45
Stan L Rev 575 (cited in note 26).
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these areas, the Court either takes cases involving marginal issues,
or almost never takes any cases at all. This suggests no great,
continuing need for expansive habeas review as a means of federal
lawmaking.
To be sure, this picture of doctrinal stability does not hold true
throughout criminal procedure. Ineffective assistance law is still in
1 °
flux, as courts try to give content to Strickland v Washington's
vague "performance" and "prejudice" prongs. Brady doctrine,
which requires prosecutors to turn over material exculpatory evidence, is also relatively undeveloped."' Batson v Kentucky' " continues to spawn important new issues, so that the federal law of jury
selection seems to change fundamentally on an annual basis. 113 And
double jeopardy law seems to shift gears with surprising regularity.114 Some of these areas (Strickland and Brady) involve the need
to create interstitial law to give content to vague constitutional
standards. Others (Batson and double jeopardy) involve important
new rulings by the Court that require substantial lower court refinement. In such areas, the Criminal Procedure Revolution is ongoing, and the need to create federal law remains strong.
But this need is easily served within the two-track system of
habeas review we have already proposed. De novo review of constitutional claims in all cases where the petitioner demonstrates a
"reasonable probability of innocence" means substantial lawmaking
authority for habeas courts in connection with almost all Brady
claims and many Strickland claims. Meanwhile, Batson issues regularly arise in federal criminal prosecutions (and now in civil cases as
well" 5), so that the lower federal courts have plenty of non-habeas
..
0 466 US 668 (1984).
.. See Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963); United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 (1976);
United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985).
1' 476 US 79 (1986).
113See, for example, Powers v Obio, 111 S Ct 1364 (1991) (permitting Batson claims by
defendants of different race than excluded jurors); Georgia v MacCollum, 112 S Ct 2348
(1992) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges by criminal defendants).
114 See, for example, Grady v Corbin, 495 US 508 (1990) (adopting prosecution's-theory-ofthe-case approach to defining double jeopardy implications of prosecution for complex
crime); United States v Felix, 112 S Ct 1377 (1992) (suggesting traditional double jeopardy
doctrines may not apply to complex crimes); United States v Dixon, 113 S Ct 2849 (1993)
(overruling Grady, although no opinion declaring nev double jeopardy rule to replace Grady
garnered majority support).
II Edmondson v Leesville Concrete Co, 111 S Ct 2077 (1991). In addition, under Georgia v
MacCollum, 112 S Ct 2348 (1992), Batson also applies to peremptories used by defense counsel
in criminal cases.
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opportunities for crafting new federal rules. The same is even more
true of double jeopardy issues, many of which are triggered primarily by such complex federal crimes as RICO and CCE. There is
thus little need for federal lawmaking on habeas in areas where a
"reasonableness" standard of review would restrict it, while in areas
where the need is great, there are many opportunities to satisfy it.

D. CONCLUSION: A TWO-TRACK SYSTEM OF HABEAS

We have tried to describe and justify the broad outlines of a
habeas jurisprudence that aims at directly fulfilling the goals of
criminal procedure, something habeas law does not currently do.
The core of this jurisprudence is our proposal of two independent
tracks of habeas review. We would grant habeas relief whenever a
petitioner could show either (1) a constitutional violation (including
substantive due process) coupled with a reasonable probability of
an unjust outcome, that is, factual innocence, or (2) an unreasonable denial of a constitutional claim on the merits by the state
courts. The first track protects against the imprisonment of innocent persons, which Judge Friendly rightly argued should be central to habeas." 6 The second track ensures that state judges "toe
the constitutional mark"-that they adequately enforce the constitutional rules that govern police, prosecutors, and judges alikewhich Justice Harlan viewed as habeas's core mission."1 7 By creating a two-track system of habeas review, based on the values of
innocence and deterrence, the criminal justice system can accommodate both Friendly's and Harlan's views about habeas in a way
that also leaves more than adequate opportunities for federal lawmaking.
We also believe that these are the only justifications for federal
habeas review of state criminal cases. Ensuring justice for potentially innocent petitioners, deterring unreasonable decisionmaking
by state courts, and providing adequate opportunities for federal
lawmaking are all that a habeas regime can realistically hope to
accomplish. What remains is to discuss how habeas law might best
play these roles.
Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 57).
Desist v United States, 394 US 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan dissenting); Mackey v United
States, 401 US 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan dissenting and concurring in the judgment).
16

1,7 See
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III. SoME APPLICATIONS
Our proposed two-track system of habeas would do a much
better job of handling claims of individual injustice than the existing system; it would also do at least as good a job of deterring
unconstitutional conduct. These advantages flow, we believe, from
the proposal's anchor in criminal procedure.
Our proposal has another advantage: it would dramatically simplify the law of habeas corpus. Current habeas doctrine is plagued
by its complexity. This may well be an indirect consequence of
the Federalism-Nationalism debate that has dominated habeas discourse. The battle between comity and federalism on the one hand,
and federal court vindication of federal rights on the other, boils
down to a battle between less habeas review (across the board) and
more (again, across the board). Neither Federalism nor Nationalism is self-limiting: comity and federalism always offer an argument
for further restricting habeas, just as the importance of a federal
forum and the lack of parity always argue in favor of expanding it.
Predictably, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to follow either
argument to its logical end point. The result is a system of seemingly arbitrary compromises, limitations that go thus far and no
further-Federalist rules boxed in by Nationalist exceptions, or
vice versa. This describes the law of substantive scope (including
Stone v Powell and its progeny, if that is the right word), the law of
procedural default, and especially the ongoing debate about habeas
retroactivity. In all these areas, habeas doctrine has achieved a
Rube Goldberg quality that frustrates all efforts to give it logical
coherence.
A two-track habeas system of the sort we have proposed would
largely solve this problem. By abandoning the search for rules to
govern "innocence" and "deterrence" claims alike, it is possible to
avoid many of the doctrinal swamps in which habeas law is now
mired. To illustrate, we explain below how our proposal might
apply to several contentious areas of habeas doctrine.
A. SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE AND THE RULE OF STONE V POWELL

Stone v Powell"8 held that if a criminal defendant received a full
and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in
118428 US 465 (1976).
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state court, that claim would not be available to him on federal
habeas. Full and fair opportunity is defined broadly, so Stone
amounts to an almost total exclusion of Fourth Amendment claims
from habeas." 9 The decision once seemed likely to spawn a whole
category of constitutional claims that would fall outside the scope
of habeas, but that has not happened. Stone is today, as it was
seventeen years ago, the sole exception to the rule that federal
habeas review extends to all constitutional claims. We believe that
the exception is probably a bad idea.
Two justifications seem to support the holding in Stone. The
first is not terribly problematic: Fourth Amendment claims are
unrelated to innocence and guilt, so habeas review is not necessary
to prevent unjust outcomes.12 ° We argued in Part II that the categorical approach to innocence and guilt does not work, that most
rules of constitutional criminal procedure protect a mix of values
that sometimes includes the reliability of the guilt determination.
It follows that the categories of innocence-related rights and other
rights do not exist; the relevant law does not usually fit neatly
into either category. Fourth Amendment claims, however, are an
exception (and a very large exception at that), since (1) they arise
only when the defendant seeks to suppress incriminating evidence,
and (2) unlike police misconduct in interrogation, police misconduct in search and seizure cases has no tendency to undermine
the reliability of any evidence that is improperly discovered. If
protecting innocent defendants were habeas's only role, in other
words, Stone might well make good sense.
Yet even in terms of protecting innocents, a Friendly-style prejudice standard would accomplish the same thing as Stone, without
the need for a special rule for search and seizure cases. If Fourth
Amendment claimants are all guilty, because their claims arise in
cases in which the police found the drugs or stolen goods on the
suspect, then the claimants will never be able to show a reasonable
probability of an unjust outcome. In innocence terms, Stone may
be harmless, but if the system were to adopt an across-the-board
prejudice standard tied to innocence, Stone would also be redundant.
119See Annotation, Wbat Constitutes "An Opportunityfor Full and Fair Litigation" in State
Court PrecludingHabeasCorpusReview Under28 U.S.C. §2254 in FederalCourt of State Prisoner's
Fourtb Amendment Claims, 75 ALR Fed 9 (1992).
2' See Stone, 428 US at 489-91.
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The real problem with Stone, though, flows from its second justification. Stone also rests on the assumption that habeas review is
not necessary to get state courts to follow the governing Fourth
Amendment law-that habeas deterrence has no role to play in
this area. ' 2 But there is no deterrence-based argument for treating
Fourth Amendment claims any differently from anything else in
constitutional criminal procedure. If state courts are good enough
to "toe the constitutional mark" in search and seizure cases, they
should be good enough to adhere to Miranda doctrine, the rules
governing peremptory challenges, double jeopardy law, and so
forth. Thus, Stone really implies that habeas review should be limited to claims of factual innocence. If Stone is right, then the second
"track" of our proposal is wrong: no deterrence-based habeas review is justified.
This could be the right bottom line. Anyone familiar with state
court criminal procedure decisions of the 1960s and the 1990s
would have to conclude that a dramatic shift has taken place. The
notion that state courts as a whole are strongly pro-government in
criminal procedure disputes seemed plausible thirty years ago, but
it is a hard sell today, at least based on our own reading of scattered
state cases. There is no good evidence (and it is hard to see how
one would go about really testing the point), but it seems more
plausible to believe that state court criminal procedure errors are
22
distributed about equally on both sides of the constitutional line. 1
Even if these happy conclusions are correct, however, the case
for habeas deterrence remains fairly powerful. Habeas need not
deter only pro-government decision making in state courts as a
whole; it is enough if even some state court systems regularly tend
to favor prosecutors and the police in deciding criminal cases.
Again, we are unaware of any evidence that might support a confident judgment in either direction.123 But it seems like quite a leap
to conclude that just because state courts in general have improved,
12 Id at 492-94. In making this assumption, Justice Powell necessarily relied on his belief
in the parity of state and federal courts. See id at 493 and n 35.
"I Note that this argument is quite different from Justice Powell's argument for parity:
state courts may well err more than federal courts, yet those errors may not be systematically
biased in the government's favor.
12 Perhaps the most noteworthy recent effort to study this question is Craig M. Bradley,
Are the State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? 77 Georgetown L J 251 (1988). Serious
methodological problems, however, inherently plague such efforts; almost inevitably, such
studies wind up relying on largely subjective judgments.
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no particular state court system requires the policing of federal
habeas courts. And because "toeing the constitutional mark" is so
important, the burden of persuasion on this issue should be on
Stone-that is, it should be up to those who wish to do away with
habeas deterrence to show (not simply assert) that such deterrence
is no longer needed anywhere. Until the showing is made, we think
skepticism is justified.
And skepticism is not, in the end, especially costly. Deterrencebased habeas review does not mean de novo review; our argument
suggests that across-the-board "reasonableness" review, akin to
qualified immunity doctrine (or to a broad reading of Teague v
Lane), would be enough to keep state courts in line. And if state
courts in fact do a good job of following the relevant constitutional
rules, "reasonableness" review will mean little in practice; most
state court decisions will be reasonable, and most defendants will
lose on habeas, absent plausible innocence claims. In short, if
Stone's assumptions about both innocence and deterrence are right,
then-under the two-track system we propose-it is redundant.
If the assumptions are wrong, it is destructive. The system would
work at least as well, and more simply, if Stone were abandoned.
B.

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Habeas doctrine has no messier thicket than the law of defaulted
claims. Thirty years ago, Fay v Noia held that a defendant who
fails to raise a claim in his state trial could still raise the same claim
on federal habeas, as long as the defendant (or his attorney-it was
never quite clear which) did not "deliberately bypass" the state
courts. 12 4 Sixteen years ago, Wainwright v Sykes' 25 virtually did
away with Fay, holding that a procedurally defaulted claim-that
is, a claim not timely raised in state court-cannot be raised on
federal court unless there was "cause" for the default and "prejudice" from failing to raise the claim. After a decade and a half of
extensive litigation, "cause" has come to mean, roughly, ineffective
assistance of counsel (defined as gross incompetence) or some serious misconduct by the state (such as active concealment of informa-

124See

Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963).

12s 433 US 72 (1977).
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tion that would have given rise to the claim).' 26 There may or
may not be other things that count as "cause." The definition of
"prejudice" is also unclear, though it appears to mean something
akin to a reasonable probability that, had the claim been timely
raised, the outcome of the state proceeding would have been different. 127 Both "cause" and "prejudice" have been, and continue to
be, the subject of enormous amounts of litigation. On top of this
cumbersome structure, the Court has now placed the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception, which permits one who is proba28
bly innocent to avoid the cause and prejudice requirements. 1
This set of rules has two major problems. First, it permits potentially grave injustices. Almost all procedural defaults are the result
of defense attorney mistakes. The narrow definition of "cause,"
however, means that most such mistakes will not excuse the default; anything short of truly awful attorney behavior will not suffice. Thus, defendants are routinely penalized for their lawyers'
errors. And this includes defendants who may well be, but cannot
show that they probably are, innocent. Second, procedural default
doctrine is a morass; it requires lawyers and judges to work through
exam every time a defendant seeks
the equivalent of a law school
29
to raise a defaulted claim.1
Both problems are easily solved, simply by separating out cases
where the petitioner has a plausible claim of innocence from cases
where he does not. If a habeas petitioner can show a reasonable
probability that his conviction was unjust-that he is innocent of
the crime charged-we believe it is wrong to deny him relief solely
because his lawyer mistakenly failed to raise a claim. In the balance
between justice for the defendant and the state's interest in enforc126See Murray v Carrier,477 US 478, 488 (1986) ("[W]e think that the existence of cause
for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some
objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's
procedural rule"). On the difficulty of showing ineffective assistance, see, for example,
Burger v Kemp, 483 US 776 (1987) (refusing to find ineffective assistance of counsel based
on conflict of interest when two members of same law firm represented co-defendants in
capital murder case).
127See John C. Jeffries, Jr. and William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural
Default in FederalHabeasCorpus, 57 U Chi L Rev 679, 684-85 and n 25 (1990) (arguing that
this is in fact the standard). The Court has never defined "prejudice" in procedural default
cases, so the process of giving content to that standard involves a good deal of inferencedrawing. See id.
12' See Murray v Carrier,477 US at 495-96.
29
Jeffries and Stuntz, 57 U Chi L Rev at 690 (cited in note 127).
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ing rules against defense lawyers, the state's interest is surely the
weaker. Current law acknowledges this point in principle, with the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, but that exception is
too narrow to do any good. We would accordingly broaden it a
notch. Once that is done, procedural defaults should be ignored in
cases involving potential innocence. The "reasonable probability"
standard takes care of prejudice, and "cause" should be irrel-

evant.

13 0

On the other hand, if the defendant is not raising a potential
innocence claim, there is no reason to exempt him from the default.
In cases where innocence and guilt are not at stake, habeas's proper
role is to ensure that state judges are doing a reasonably good job
of deciding constitutional criminal procedure claims. But if the
relevant constitutional claim was defaulted, the state court system
did not decide it. (Under current law, if the claim has been decided
on the merits, it is no longer treated as "defaulted. ' 131) There is no
state court mistake to deter. Both "cause" and "prejudice" can
safely be ignored.
In other words, our proposed two-track habeas system would
permit the virtual abolition of procedural default doctrine. "Cause"
would always be irrelevant-in potential innocence cases, because
the defendant would get relief without it; in all other cases, because
relief would be denied regardless of it. "Prejudice" would continue
to matter in cases involving innocence claims; in all other cases that
inquiry too would go by the boards. The only remaining rule
would be that state courts would have to fairly apply their proce132
dural rules, something they must do under present law anyway.
The resulting regime would treat claims of real injustice more
fairly, and would preserve deterrence of state court misbehavior.
It would also get rid of the Sykes thicket.
C. RETROACTIVITY AND THE HABEAS STANDARD OF REVIEW

With the nationalization of criminal procedure law in the 1960s
came a flood of new constitutional rules. Almost immediately, the
Supreme Court began to wrestle with the question whether (and
130For a more extended version of the argument made in this paragraph, see id at 691-93.
13,See

County Court of Ulster v Allen, 442 US 140 (1979).

132See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeiture of Federal Rights, 99 Harv L Rev 1128,

1137-45 (1986) (citing and categorizing federal court decisions holding various kinds of state
procedural grounds inadequate to bar federal review).
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if so, to what extent) those rules should be applied retroactively
on habeas-that is, applied to cases originally decided in state court
before the new rules existed. 133 The Court has not stopped wresling with the issue since.
The latest and most controversial installment in the Court's ret34
roactivity saga is the line of cases spawned by Teague v Lane. 1
The plurality in Teague (since adopted by several Court opinions)
went a step' beyond prior retroactivity analyses: Teague concluded
not only that habeas courts generally may not apply new rules
retroactively, but that habeas courts generally may not create new
rules either.135 This makes the definition of "new rules" enormously
important. On that score, the Court has not spoken clearly. Two
years ago a pair of majority opinions described a new rule as anything not "compelled" by existing precedent. 136 As one of us has
pointed out, this definition would turn retroactivity doctrine into
a relaxed habeas standard of review for purely legal issues: as long
as the state court decision was reasonable given the then-existing
federal law-that is, the contrary position was not compelled by
precedent-it cannot be overturned on federal habeas. 137 Yet in
Wright v West, several Justices heatedly denied that Teague established a habeas standard of review for questions of law; 138 moreover, the Court in Wright declined to adopt a rule of "deference"
to reasonable state court decisions concerning mixed questions of law
and fact. 139 So it remains unclear how "new rule" is to be defined.
Of all the Court's recent habeas initiatives, we think-unlike

'" See, for example, Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965) (retroactive application to
habeas cases of Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961)); Tehan v United States ex rel Shott, 382 US
406 (1966) (retroactive application to habeas cases of Giffin v California, 380 US 609 (1965));
Johnson v New Jersey, 384 US 719 (1966) (retroactive application to habeas cases of Escobedo
v Illinois, 378 US 478 (1964), and Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)).
14 489 US 288 (1989).
135Id at 315-16. Teague has tvo exceptions-one for claims of substantive unconstitutionality, and the other for "watershed" rules of criminal procedure seriously implicating innocence. Id at 311-14. The second exception is unlikely ever to apply; the real "watershed"
rules are already in place. And the first exception will only very rarely apply outside
the death penalty context, the one context where substantive constitutional restraints are
common.
136Butler v McKellar, 494 US 407 (1990); Sawyer v Smith, 497 US 227 (1990).
13'
Hoffmann, 1989 Supreme Court Review at 180-84 (cited in note 104).

138112 S Ct at 2496-97 (O'Connor, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, concurring in the
judgment); id at 2498-99 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
139The Court left this issue open, though four of the seven Justices who expressed a view
about it were critical of the idea of "reasonableness" review for mixed questions.
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almost everyone else who has written about it-that Teague is potentially the most useful. Its chief problem is that, as in the rest
of habeas law, the Court does not distinguish in Teague between innocence-related and non-innocence-related claims. For
innocence-related claims, we see no reason to apply Teague's general
rule of non-retroactivity at all. But for non-innocence-related
claims, there is every reason to extend Teague to its logical conclusion and require habeas courts to look generally, not at whether
the challenged state court decision was right, but at whether that
decision was reasonable. Once the distinction is drawn between
innocence- and non-innocence-related claims, in other words,
Teague can be seen for what it really is: not a retroactivity decision,
but rather a decision about the appropriate standard of review in
14
habeas cases. 0
We have already explained why Teague should not apply to the
proposed first track of habeas. If a defendant can show a reasonable
probability of innocence, plus a constitutional violation-under the
law in effect at the time of the federal habeas decision-that should
suffice to justify habeas relief. The "reasonableness" of the state
court's decision is not particularly relevant, since the point of habeas relief in such a case would not be to deter state court mistakes
but to rectify injustice. The point is the same as in the procedural
default context: it seems wrong to uphold a conviction in the face of
both unconstitutional conduct (under today's law) and a substantial
likelihood of an unjust outcome, solely because the state court is
not blameworthy.
Under the proposed second track of habeas, however, where the
defendant's claim is not that his conviction is unjust, but that habeas relief is needed for deterrence, an across-the-board "reasonableness" standard of review is appropriate. If the entire point of
the second track of habeas is deterrence, and if the deterrence
message is aimed at state courts, then the "reasonableness" of the
140This is why Teague seems to be so out of step with the rest of the Court's recent
retroactivity caselaw. Outside the habeas context, in both criminal and civil cases, the Court
has made clear that its decisions must generally be applied fully retroactively. See, for
example, Giffitb v Kentucky, 479 US 314 (1987) (criminal case);JamesB. Beam Distilling Co.
v Georgia, III S Ct 2439 (1991) (civil case); Harper v Virginia Department of Taxation, 113 S
Ct 2510 (1993) (civil case).
One of us previously has expressed some concerns about Teague's deferential standard of
review. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Startingfrom Scratch: Rethinking FederalHabeas Review of
Death Penalty Cases, 20 Fla St U L Rev 133 (1992); Hoffmann, 1990 BYU L Rev 183 (cited
in note 62); Hoffmann, 1989 Supreme Court Review 165 (cited in note 104). These concerns

HABEAS CORPUS

117

state court decision is precisely what should matter to the habeas
court. It makes no difference, for deterrence purposes, whether
the relevant constitutional issue is characterized as purely legal,
purely factual, or a mixed issue of law and fact. The "reasonable-

ness" standard (which, by the way, is surely sufficiently malleable
to ensure that habeas courts can establish whatever standard of
care they deem appropriate with respect to state court adjudication

of federal issues) works just as well for all three kinds of issues.
A "reasonableness" standard of review for all non-innocencerelated claims would greatly simplify habeas law while expanding
the ability of defendants to raise claims of individual injustice.
Under current habeas doctrine, habeas courts must first categorize
an issue as legal, factual, or mixed. Review is then highly deferential on factual issues (under the federal habeas statute, state court

findings of fact are generally presumed correct if the court's proce142
dures were fair);141 de novo on mixed questions of law and fact;
and on legal issues, under Teague, apparently available only for
unreasonable errors of law by state judges, although Wright v West

suggests this standard may not always apply.143 This convoluted
construct is indefensible. A "reasonableness" standard of review

for all non-innocence-related claims is both logically defensible and
much simpler.
A system such as the one we propose would mean that some

constitutional violations would go unremedied on habeas. State
court decisions that are erroneous, but not unreasonably so, and

that do not lead to the conviction of a potentially innocent defendant, would not be subject to reversal by a habeas court. This
supposed problem has prompted much of the criticism of Teague.
seem, in retrospect, to relate primarily to the application of a Teague-like rule of deference
to prior adjudication of innocence-related claims.
14128 USC § 2254(d); Sumner v Mata, 449 US 539 (1981).
141Miller V Fenton, 474 US 104 (1985).
143Compare Butler v McKellar, 494 US 407, 414 (1990) ("The 'new rule' principle...
validates reasonable, good faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions") with Wijgbt v West, 112 S
Ct 2482, 2497 (1992) (O'Connor concurring in the judgment) ("Teague requires courts to ask
whether the rule a habeas petitioner seeks can be meaningfully distinguished from that
established by binding precedent at the time his state court conviction became final ...
Even though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether 'reasonable jurists'
could disagree as to whether a result is dictated by precedent .... the standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is 'objective,' and the mere existence of conflicting
authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new").
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But the criticism misperceives the nature of the constitutional violations-that is, it misperceives the nature of modern criminal procedure. Violations of constitutional criminal procedure rules can inflict serious injury or slight harm on criminal defendants; they can
be case-specific or structural; they can bear directly on whether
the right person was convicted or have nothing to do with the
accuracy of the guilty verdict. Criminal litigation is used to enforce
rules in all these categories. It is used to protect both individual
defendants and other constituencies, like potential jurors or innocent citizens who might be targets of police searches. What it means
to "remedy" a given violation should depend on such factors, and
on the procedural setting in which the issue arises.
To put it another way, every right deserves a remedy, but it is not
true that every violation deserves every possible remedy. Where the
interest in avoiding the conviction of innocents is directly at stake,
habeas relief is necessary to avoid injustice. Where that interest is not
directly at stake, habeas has no real compensatory role to play. And
a "reasonableness" standard of review fully satisfies the habeas deterrence interest. Finally, Section 1983 actions are still available to compensate injuries other than wrongful conviction.
For the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has been seeking
some doctrinal device for separating habeas claims worth hearing
from those not worth hearing. Stone v Powell, procedural default
doctrine, and Teague are all products of that search. Teague is far
preferable to the other two: unlike Stone it does not require categorization of rights in the abstract, and unlike procedural default doctrine it responds directly to the reasonableness of state court decision making. Moreover, given a separate track of de novo habeas
review for potential innocence claims, Teague's "reasonableness"
standard of review renders the other two doctrines completely unnecessary. The real problem with Teague is that it does not go far
enough: because of the Court's unfortunate decision in Wright v
West, we have been left with a hodge-podge habeas standard of
review. Teague needs not to be abandoned (as the critics have
urged), but to be expanded.
IV. HABEAS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Since the revival of capital punishment in the mid-1970s,
habeas has been the primary battleground for death penalty litigation. One commentator has estimated that habeas relief is granted
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in almost half of all death penalty cases, 144 as compared to a minuscule success rate on habeas in non-capital cases. 1 4 In these circumstances, it would be unthinkable to propose a new way of thinking
about habeas law without considering its impact on the administration of the death penalty.
Under our general approach, habeas law should apply to capital
cases in a manner that reflects the nature of the underlying federal
constitutional rights that are enforced in those cases. Because the
federal constitutional rights that are unique to death penalty litigation (namely, most of the intricate substantive and procedural
rights that the Court has derived from the Eighth Amendment)
may substantially differ from the rights that exist in non-capital
cases, habeas law should perhaps differ as well.
The difference does not come into play in cases involving habeas's deterrence role. In cases where the primary purpose of granting habeas relief is to deter state court mistakes, there is no reason
to treat the Eighth Amendment any differently from the Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth Amendments. If a state court acts unreasonably in
construing or applying the Eighth Amendment in a capital case,
habeas relief should be available. If the state court acts reasonably
in interpreting and applying the relevant federal law, habeas relief
should (to the extent deterrence alone is at stake) be denied.
The problem with death penalty cases is the difficulty of
applying the concept of "innocence" to capital sentencing. The
Court's modern Eighth Amendment law, and the fundamental values and concerns on which that law is based, clearly contemplate
a notion of substantive justice in capital sentencing that extends
well beyond the protection of defendants who are innocent of capital murder. 146 But how much further does this concept of substantive justice in capital sentencing extend? What is the analogue, in
144Professor James Liebman has determined that, betveen 1976 and 1985, the overall
success rate for death penalty petitioners in habeas was 49 percent. See Liebman, Federal
Habeas Corpus at 23-24 n 97 (cited in note 5).
141Professor Liebman notes that, in fiscal year 1985, only 1.2% of all habeas petitions
decided by the federal district courts even received a hearing before final disposition, and
only 15% of appealed habeas cases resulted in reversals or remands of the district court's
disposition. Id.
"4 See, for example, Lockett v Obio, 438 US 586 (1978) (recognizing constitutional right
to present mitigating evidence, based on need for individualized sentencing to consider,
inter alia, personal moral culpability of defendant); Enmund v Florida, 458 US 782 (1982),
and Tison v Arizona, 481 US 137 (1987) (establishing minimum constitutional requirements
of personal moral culpability for imposition of death penalty on non-triggerman felony
murderer).
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capital sentencing, of a defendant's claim that he is innocent of the
crime?
The Supreme Court faced this problem in Sawyer v Wbitley.1 7
Whitley involved the scope of the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the procedural default/successive petition/abuse
of the writ bars to habeas relief. 148 The specific question was, what
kinds of capital defendants should be able to use this exception
when challenging errors in capital sentencing proceedings? Only
those defendants who claim to be innocent of their capital crime?
Those who claim to be "innocent" of the aggravating circumstances
that made them death-eligible? Those who contend that their death
sentences are undeserved, despite their factual guilt? Or those who
complain that, though they may deserve to die for their crimes in
the abstract, other defendants of equal or greater culpability have
not been sentenced to death?
In Whitley, the Court held that "fundamental miscarriage of justice," in the context of capital sentencing, requires a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would find
the existence of an aggravating circumstance that would render
the defendant death-eligible. The Court concluded that any less
stringent standard would be too subjective and would seriously
undermine the cause-and-prejudice standard for procedural default
by allowing capital defendants to obtain habeas relief upon a showing of "prejudice," whether or not they could show "cause" for the
default. 149
Whether one agrees with the Court's particular resolution of the
"innocence" issue in Whitley will depend on one's own views about
the administration of the death penalty. Some would argue that
there is nothing seriously wrong with executing any defendant who
commits a capital crime and also meets basic statutory requirements of aggravation that justify, in general, the imposition of the
death penalty. "' According to this position, the overriding concern
141 112 S Ct 2514 (1992).
141 See Murray v Carrier,477 US 478 (1986) (applying "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
exception to procedural default rule of Wainwrigbt v Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977)); Kublmann v
Wilson, 477 US 436 (1986) (applying exception to successive petition rule); McCleskey v Zant,
III S Ct 1454 (1991) (applying exception to abuse-of-the-writ rule).
'49

Wbitley, 112 S Ct at 2521-25 and n 13.

Is0 See, for example, Ernest van den Haag, The Collapse of the Case Against CapitalPunish-

ment, National Review (March 31, 1978), at 397 ("The Constitution, though it enjoins us
to minimize capriciousness, does not enjoin a standard of unattainable perfection or exclude
penalties because that standard has not been attained").
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in administering a death penalty system is preventing the execution
of a defendant who is ineligibleto receive a death sentence. Beyond
such eligibility concerns, some imprecision in actually meting out
capital punishment to defendants is probably inevitable and generally morally acceptable.
Others would contend, however, that capital punishment must
be reserved for those defendants who are truly the most deserving
of death-and that even defendants who have committed aggravated capital crimes may properly claim injustice if they are given
death sentences when others of equal or greater culpability receive
prison terms.' 5' On this argument, the death penalty cannot be
imposed in a morally acceptable fashion unless a precise "fit" is
achieved between those defendants who most deserve it and those
who actually receive it.
Without trying to resolve this moral debate, we believe that our
approach to habeas offers the best route to a solution. Whatever
ultimately emerges as the most appropriate definition of "injustice"
in capital sentencing-whatever turns out to be the most appropriate analogue in capital sentencing to a defendant's claim of innocence of a crime-should become an additional avenue for obtaining de novo review on federal habeas. If a capital defendant
can combine an asserted federal constitutional violation with a sufficiently substantial allegation of "injustice" in capital sentencing
(however that term may ultimately be defined), the habeas court
52
should provide de novo review of the defendant's federal claim.1
In other words, habeas doctrine for capital cases should depend
on the substantive goals of the constitutional criminal procedure
rules that govern those cases. The goals themselves, and their
proper relationship to just outcomes, are in dispute. But that dis151See, for example, Nathanson, An Eye for an Eye?: The Morality of Punishing by Death
62 (1987) ("If death is arbitrarily imposed on only some who deserve it, while others equally
deserving are treated more leniently, then those who are executed are treated unjustly, even
if they deserved to die").
152By analogy to non-capital cases, a capital defendant should be entitled to de novo
habeas review of his constitutional claims upon a showing of a "reasonable probability" that
an "injustice" (however that term may be defined) has occurred in his capital sentencing.
In addition, we reiterate here our view that a "naked" innocence claim of the sort presented
to the Court in Herrerav Collins, 113 S Ct 853 (1993), if supported by a sufficiently strong
showing of potential innocence (even stronger than a "reasonable probability of innocence"),
warrants habeas relief in a non-capital case under substantive due process. By analogy, a
capital defendant should be entitled to habeas relief upon a similarly strong showing of a
potential "injustice" (however that term may be defined) in his capital sentencing. This
result could be based on either the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment.
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pute ought to be addressed directly, not fought out through the
proxy of habeas doctrine.
On the other side of the coin, habeas doctrine for non-capital
cases should not be held hostage to disputes about the death penalty. As one of us recently argued,15 3 battles over capital punishment have for too long distorted habeas doctrine ostensibly designed for all criminal cases. Unlike the Court, we see no reason
to assume that the same habeas rules should govern both capital
and non-capital cases. Just as innocence claims should, in our view,
be treated differently under habeas law than non-innocence claims,
so too should the special nature of substantive justice in capital
sentencing give rise to a special way of obtaining de novo habeas
review, and potential habeas relief.
V.

CONCLUSION

The current debate about habeas is sterile. Judicial opinions
and law review articles expound on the importance of federalism
and federal rights, and debate the meanihg of decades-old Supreme
Court habeas decisions. But habeas is part of a criminal justice
system in which federalism died a generation ago, when the Court
nationalized the law of criminal procedure. In this system, as a
practical matter, all criminal procedure rights are federal rights,
and those federal rights are enforced routinely in state courts. In
this system, there is no need to allocate power between state and
federal spheres of sovereignty, because state law's sphere of sovereignty no longer exists. And the federal law that governs this system has changed so dramatically that forty-year-old Supreme
Court habeas decisions might as well have come from another
planet.
It is time to change the terms of the discussion. Habeas review
can play several useful roles in the criminal justice system, but we
can identify and implement those roles only if we start seeing habeas as a part of criminal procedure, rather than as simply a weapon
in a battle between federal and state law. Seen as a part of criminal
procedure, habeas can advance individual justice by giving special
"' See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's
Continuing Problems with FederalHabeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 Ind L J 817 (1993);
Hoffmann, 20 Fla St U L Rev 133 (cited in note 140).
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status to constitutional rights coupled with substantial claims of
innocence. Habeas review can also help ensure that the law of
criminal procedure is obeyed by state and local actors, by overturning unreasonable interpretations and applications of that law by
state judges. And habeas can do these things while still giving
federal courts sufficient opportunities for federal lawmaking, at
least in the context of a system where, in many areas, welldeveloped bodies of law already exist.
We propose two critical changes. The first is the realization that
habeas need not operate on the principle that "one size fits all."
Habeas is a remedy, and most remedies properly take account of
the nature and magnitude of the wrong. In this context, that means
treating innocence-related claims differently from other claims, a
result that follows naturally from the fact that habeas is part of a
system whose chief goal is to separate the innocent from the guilty.
Habeas can provide a significant layer of protection for innocent
defendants, but only if innocence-related claims are freed from
the restrictions of the procedural default and habeas retroactivity
doctrines.
The second is the recognition of the great opportunity presented
by Teague. Though no recent habeas decision has received more
criticism than Teague, it actually offers a way out of the habeas
swamp: if followed to its logical conclusion, Teague could quickly
lead to the establishment of a general habeas standard of reviewfor non-innocence-related claims-that would eliminate the need
for Stone v Powell, procedural default doctrine, and even a separate
habeas retroactivity doctrine. Teague offers the potential to untie
all of these knots because, unlike Stone v Powell, Wainwright v Sykes,
and all previous attempts to separate new rules from old ones,
Teague focuses directly on the reasonableness of state court decision
making. This is precisely the right focus for habeas in its deterrence
role.
Protecting innocence, deterring unreasonable state court decision
making, and providing sufficient opportunities for federal lawmaking-these are the goals that modern habeas law should strive to
achieve. If we cast aside the debate about federalism, comity, the
right to a federal forum, and the parity of state and federal courts,
we can do a much better job of reaching these goals.

